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BAIT AND SWITCH: WHY UNITED STATES V.
MORRISON IS WRONG ABOUT SECTION 5
Kermit Roosevelt III†
In United States v. Morrison, the Supreme Court announced the rule
that the Section 5 power cannot be used to regulate private individuals.
This is one of the most meaningful and, thus far, durable constraints that
the Court has placed on federal power.  It is the more surprising, then, that it
turns out to be based on essentially nothing at all.  The Morrison Court
asserted that its rule was derived by—indeed, “controlled by”—precedent, but
a closer reading of the Reconstruction-era decisions it cites shows that this is
simply not the case.  An independent evaluation of the rule against regula-
tion of private individuals suggests that it cannot be defended on its own
merits.  Thus, the Article urges that Morrison be overruled.
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INTRODUCTION
The Framers of our Constitution drew from many sources, and
much of the governmental structure they created was familiar to the
eighteenth century.1  But the Framers had one great innovation:
federalism.2  They “split the atom of sovereignty,” in Justice Kennedy’s
memorable phrasing, dividing power among two levels of govern-
ment.3  These two levels would be distinct and different in some im-
portant ways (the federal government, for instance, has exclusive
authority over foreign relations), but their authorities would also over-
lap.4  Each would compete for the affection and loyalties of the peo-
ple; each would be able to offer some protection from the other.
It should be no surprise, then, that most of the great struggles of
our constitutional history have linked themselves to federalism.  Fre-
quently, a pattern recurs in which a national-level majority captures
the federal government while its opponents retain majority status in
some states.  The majority then seeks to enforce its views through the
federal government while the minority resists in the name of states’
rights.
Casting the issue in these terms suggests that the national side
will tend to prevail—after all, it has both majority and supremacy on
its side.5  Indeed, that has been the pattern with respect to individual
issues.6  Even with respect to the larger question of the balance of
1 For a discussion of origins, see, for example, FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO
SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 227 (1985); JACK N. RAKOVE,
ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 3–5 (1996);
GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 80–81 (1992).  For a
discussion of the Constitution, see generally AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A
BIOGRAPHY (2006).
2 See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (“Federalism was our Nation’s own discovery.  The Framers split the atom of
sovereignty.  It was the genius of their idea that our citizens would have two political capaci-
ties, one state and one federal, each protected from incursion by the other.”); Ernest A.
Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 14 (2004) (describing feder-
alism as “shattering the notion that political authority must remain undivided”).
3 Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 838.
4 For example, both state and federal governments can levy taxes. See, e.g.,
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (1 Wheat) 316, 425 (1819) (“That the power of taxation
is . . . retained by the States; that it is not abridged by the grant of a similar power to the
government of the Union . . . are truths which have never been denied.”).
5 The federal government does have some potentially countermajoritarian features.
Due to the operation of the electoral college, a president can be elected despite losing the
popular vote, and equal representation in the Senate dramatically inflates the political
power of small states relative to their population.  Generally, however, a political move-
ment must command the support of a national majority in order to take the reins of power
at the federal level.  The supremacy of such a movement comes simply from the Supremacy
Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. VI.
6 The most notable such issue is perhaps the civil rights struggle, where federal con-
stitutional rights and antidiscrimination laws eventually overcame state-centered resistance.
See, e.g., ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE PROTECTION OF FUNDA-
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power between the nation and the states, American constitutional his-
tory has been a steady series of victories for the nationalists.  The ratifi-
cation of the Constitution, replacing the looser, state-centric Articles
of Confederation, was the first step.  The Civil War, though in impor-
tant ways a rupture and break in our constitutional system, was
another: the Reconstruction Amendments restrained the states in new
ways and correspondingly empowered the federal government.7  The
Progressive-era Sixteenth and Seventeenth Amendments, though not
aimed directly at state authority, shifted the balance substantially in
favor of the federal government.8  The New Deal settlement ushered
in expanded federal legislative power and a massive administrative
state.9  The Warren Court affirmed broad congressional authority and
enforced constitutional rights more aggressively against the states.10
But the story is not quite as uniform as the litany above might
make it out to be.  Our constitutional system divides power not just
between the states and the federal government but also among the
branches of the federal government, and those branches have differ-
ent incentives with respect to federalism issues.  Congress and the
President, though they occasionally jockey against each other, are
wielders of linked federal power: Congress makes laws, and the Presi-
dent enforces them.11  What expands the power of one of these
elected branches, vis-à-vis the states, usually empowers the other as
well.  Consequently, they have tended to be fairly consistent advocates
MENTAL RIGHTS 46 (2009) (“The civil rights movement presented yet another struggle
about the meaning of federalism, and once again the forces of nationalization tri-
umphed.”).  There are also much more mundane issues, such as the question of whether a
car rental agency can be held vicariously liable for injuries caused by rented vehicles, which
end up settled by federal law despite contrary state preferences. See 49 U.S.C. § 30106
(2013).  The only way in which the states’ rights side can prevail, typically, is by mustering
enough popular support to recapture the federal government.  For example, the Resolu-
tions of some states against the Alien and Sedition Acts had no practical effect.  What
blunted the impact of those laws was Jefferson’s victory in the election of 1800 and his
subsequent pardons of those imprisoned under the Acts. See JOHN C. MILLER, CRISIS IN
FREEDOM: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION ACTS 231 (1951).  To put the point slightly differently,
when those who have argued for states’ rights win on a particular issue, their victory fre-
quently comes through national action, rather than a vindication of states’ rights.
7 See U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, XV.
8 See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
300 (1998); Edward L. Rubin, The Fundamentality and Irrelevance of Federalism, 13 GA. ST. U.
L. REV. 1009, 1053 (1997) (noting that these amendments “represent the culmination of
the Progressive Era’s nationalizing force”).
9 See generally Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1, 1–2
(1950) (stating the New Deal created a “consolidated national power” that had to “guaran-
tee economic security to all”).
10 See, e.g., Pamela Brandwein, Dueling Histories: Charles Fairman and William Crosskey
Reconstruct “Original Understanding,” 30 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 289, 291 (1996) (noting “nation-
alist and egalitarian” character of the Warren Court decisions).
11 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
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of broad federal power.12  The Supreme Court, however, can expand
its own authority at the expense of the other federal branches.  One
might expect it consequently to be less biased in favor of federal
power—at least, federal legislative or executive power.13
Indeed, the Court’s stance with respect to federalism has been
notably different from that of the elected branches.  When it comes to
issues of the Court versus the states, there has been a general trend in
favor of greater judicial and hence national power.  In deciding equal
protection questions, for instance, the Court has tended to enforce
the views of a national majority against outlier states, striking down
discriminatory practices when a national majority has come to view
them as unjustified or oppressive.14  With respect to federal executive
or legislative power, however, the Court’s behavior has been much
more mixed.  The general pattern of expanding federal power ob-
tains; the Court has not stopped the consolidation of power within the
federal government.  But it has also offered resistance, though episod-
ically and without much notable or durable success.15
12 When they deviate from this pattern, it is typically because of partisan effects.  (The
struggle between Congress and the President over Reconstruction, for instance, occurred
because of the substitution of the Democrat Andrew Johnson for the Republican Abraham
Lincoln.) See Keith E. Whittington, Bill Clinton Was No Andrew Johnson: Comparing the Two
Impeachments, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 422, 430–39 (2000).  The Framers assumed institutional
loyalty—they assumed that individual officeholders would have some desire to protect or
increase the powers of their offices.  They did not foresee partisan loyalty, which can over-
whelm institutional loyalty. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654
(Jackson, J., concurring) (“Moreover, rise of the party system has made a significant
extraconstitutional supplement to real executive power. . . . Party loyalties and interests,
sometimes more binding than law, extend [the President’s] effective control into branches
of government other than his own . . . .”).  For elaboration of Jackson’s insight, see Daryl J.
Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311,
2349–56 (2006).
13 Justices are, of course, selected by the President and confirmed by the Senate, so
the Court is staffed by the national government.  All the same, institutional loyalty seems to
have a strong effect on the Justices, perhaps as a consequence of life tenure.  The Court is
also less susceptible than the other branches to partisan capture.  Because of life tenure,
the Court’s membership turns over quite slowly, so a political movement must usually hold
the presidency for a long time in order to change the balance of power on the Court.  Put
differently, the Court usually lags the elected branches; it reflects the views of the coalition
that held power some years previously.
14 See, e.g., Kermit Roosevelt III, Interpretation and Construction: Originalism and Its Dis-
contents, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 99, 102–03 (2011) (noting that the Equal Protection
Clause has generally operated as an antifederalist rather than countermajoritarian provi-
sion).  More broadly, the Court has tended over time to increase its enforcement of consti-
tutional restraints on states.  A notable counterexample is the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) 36, 74–78 (1872), where the Court drastically narrowed the scope of the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause.
15 To put the point broadly, in the sweep of history, the Court has become more
deferential to Congress and less deferential to states.  This was especially true of the
Warren Court, which combined a deferential New Deal–style stance on federal power with
aggressive review of state action. See, e.g., Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 308 (1969) (af-
firming broad federal commerce power); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 658 (1966)
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Over the years, the Court has come up with several different doc-
trines that attempt to limit federal power.  This Article will focus on
one of them: the rule, announced in United States v. Morrison,16 that
Congress’s power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment cannot be
used to regulate private parties.  This rule is successful in some ways—
it has some of the characteristics that we should want doctrine to
have.17  But it is also lacking in perhaps the most important character-
istic: it cannot be justified by reference to the meaning or purpose of
the constitutional provision it is supposed to implement.18  Worse, it
was produced through a deceptive decision, a blatant misreading of
precedent that effected a bait and switch on the advocates of congres-
sional power.19
Or so I will argue.  The first Part of this Article surveys the Court’s
work in the federalism arena.  It identifies several doctrines the Court
has created to limit federal power and protect state authority.  It con-
cludes that most of them are ineffectual for various reasons.  The
Section 5 limit announced in Morrison, unusually, is both meaningful
and capable of consistent application by lower courts.  It is thus, in
some ways, a success.
The rest of the Article makes the case that, nonetheless, this rule
is wrong and should be abandoned.  Part II examines Morrison: the
background to and nature of the federal legislation, the briefing, and
the Court’s decision.  It sets out the story largely as the Court told it.
Part III begins the critical look: it examines the Reconstruction-era
federal civil rights legislation, and the Supreme Court decision invali-
dating it, on which Morrison relied. Morrison’s presentation of that
story, I suggest, is exceedingly deceptive.  Part IV compares the
Court’s action in the Civil Rights Cases, widely considered to be one of
(affirming broad Section 5 power); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 US 533, 568 (1964), (imposing
“one person, one vote” rule).  The Rehnquist Court moderated both positions, searching
for limits to federal authority and granting more deference to states. See, e.g., United States
v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (invalidating parts of federal Violence Against Wo-
men Act); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876
(1992) (announcing more deferential “undue burden” standard for review of abortion
regulation).  In cases in which an expansion of congressional power seems to threaten the
Court’s authority, most notably those dealing with Congress’s power to enforce the Four-
teenth Amendment, the Court has been more aggressive in its review of federal laws. See,
e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001); City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
16 529 U.S. 598, 621 (2000).
17 By doctrine, I mean the tests that the Court creates to implement constitutional
meaning.  “No regulation of private parties under the Section 5 power” is a doctrinal rule;
“no undue burden on the choice to obtain a previability abortion” is another.  The text will
offer some discussion of what factors might make a particular doctrinal rule desirable. See
infra text accompanying notes 77–80.  For further analysis, see generally KERMIT R
ROOSEVELT III, THE MYTH OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 22–47 (2006).
18 See infra Part V.
19 See infra Part IV.B.
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its worst decisions, to Morrison, making the case that in many ways
Morrison is substantially worse.  And Part V concludes by asking
whether, the misleading claims of Morrison aside, there are any good
reasons to be offered in support of the rule that private parties are
immune from Section 5 legislation.
I
A SURVEY OF THE COURT’S WORK
A. Phases of Federalism
As noted in the preceding section, federal power has expanded
over our constitutional history.  It has not done so continuously; in-
stead, the expansion has come in bursts.  Virtually without exception,
each of those bursts has met at least an initial phase of judicial resis-
tance.20  The Civil War presented the starkest imaginable conflict be-
tween national and state power. It ended in a victory for the national
side, and it was followed by constitutional amendments designed to
enhance national power at the expense of the states.  The Reconstruc-
tion Amendments—the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth—
offered a dramatically different vision of constitutional structure and
the relation between the states and the federal government.  No
longer were the states the primary guarantors of liberty, relied on to
counterbalance the threat of federal tyranny and left largely alone
with respect to their treatment of their own citizens.  That was the
vision of the Revolution, and also of the Framing, but in the minds of
the Reconstruction Congress, Gettysburg and Antietam were more
vivid than Philadelphia and Bunker Hill.  So the Fourteenth Amend-
ment imposed new limits on the states and empowered Congress to
enforce those limits.21  This second founding gave us the framework
for most modern constitutional law, one vastly different from the
founding model.22  As the Civil War was the starkest conflict between
nation and states, so Reconstruction was the greatest expansion of fed-
eral power.
But the Supreme Court, I have noted, tends to lag political move-
ments, and Reconstruction was no exception.  During Reconstruction,
the Court pushed back with a narrow reading of the Reconstruction
20 See, e.g., supra note 15 and accompanying text. R
21 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
22 Ask nonlawyers for great or famous Supreme Court decisions, and they will (based
on my experience polling first-year law students) almost always come up with cases in
which the Court applied Fourteenth Amendment rights against the states, cases such as
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954), Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973),
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966) (applying Fifth Amendment prophylactic
rule to states), Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963), or even Bush v. Gore, 531
U.S. 98, 105 (2000).
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Amendments, most notably in the Slaughter-House Cases.23  By the time
later decisions, such as the Civil Rights Cases, came along, federal
troops had been withdrawn from the South and Reconstruction aban-
doned.24  The aftermath of Reconstruction was the rare battle that the
advocates of states’ rights won.
The failure of Reconstruction did not end the contest, however.
The Progressive era brought two amendments, the Sixteenth and Sev-
enteenth, that substantially weakened federalism.  The Sixteenth, by
authorizing the federal income tax, ensured that the federal govern-
ment would be able to amass and spend—or threaten to withhold—
vast amounts of money.25  By ushering in a world in which substantial
federal support for many state activities was the norm, the Sixteenth
Amendment made the spending power a much more potent weapon
against the states than it had been at the founding.  Equally impor-
tant, the Seventeenth Amendment removed perhaps the most signifi-
cant structural protection for states’ interests.  Entrusting the
selection of senators to state legislatures placed that choice in the
hands of the one constituency that might plausibly be supposed to
value state authority for its own sake.26  Removing it meant that
whatever powers the federal government had would henceforth be
wielded with much less fear of displeasing state legislatures—much
less concern, that is, over whether a particular issue might best be left
to states.27
23 83 U.S. 36, 77–78 (1873).  As this Article will discuss in greater detail, the Court
also struck down some federal antidiscrimination laws as exceeding Congress’s power to
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. See United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 639 (1883);
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883).
24 See, e.g., Ryan C. Williams, Originalism and the Other Desegregation Decision, 99 VA. L.
REV. 493, 570–71 (2013).
25 See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 205 (1987) (addressing a federal
threat to withhold tax dollars if states failed to adopt uniform drinking age).
26 Post–Seventeenth Amendment rhetoric about the political safeguards of federalism
must thus be taken with a grain of salt, particularly to the extent that it invokes the Fram-
ers’ design.  For example, see Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528,
550–51 & n.11 (1985) (arguing for lack of substantive Supreme Court federalism review on
the grounds that “the principal means chosen by the Framers to ensure the role of the
States in the federal system lies in the structure of the Federal Government itself”);
Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition
and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 546–47 (1954) (characteriz-
ing the Senate as “the forum of the states” and claiming that “Madison’s analysis has never
lost its thrust” despite “the shift to popular election of the Senate”).  Whether the party
system that corrodes the horizontal separation of powers within the federal government
can actually enhance the vertical separation of powers between the federal government
and the states is an interesting question. See Larry Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the
Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 269 (2000).  For an excellent anal-
ysis, see Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 9
(2010).
27 The theory that allowing state legislatures to select senators will tend to reserve
federal power for cases in which it is needed is the following.  State legislators want to be
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The Progressives also encountered Supreme Court pushback; the
Court of the Progressive era is what we commonly call the Lochner
Court.28  The pushback can be understood as largely a reaction to the
Seventeenth Amendment.  It did not explicitly take the form of trying
to replace the political safeguard the amendment eliminated, nor of
an inquiry whether federal action was needed to solve a particular
problem.  But it served a similar purpose.  The main move that the
Lochner Court made against federal authority was to strike down
pretextual uses of it.  In Hammer v. Dagenhart,29 and again in Bailey v.
Drexel Furniture,30 the Court was willing to look beyond the form of a
law and inquire into the motive behind it.  If the Court found the
motive improper, it would strike down even a law that regulated the
shipment of goods across state lines—something surely within the lit-
eral terms of the commerce power.31  This pretext analysis was not
entirely novel—Chief Justice Marshall actually endorsed it in the
otherwise nationalist McCulloch decision32—but it did respond to the
main concern raised by the Seventeenth Amendment.  Without state
legislatures to ride herd on the Senate, Congress might start using
federal power unnecessarily or for improper reasons.  The Lochner-era
Court attempted to step into that breach.  Additionally, in a move-
ment that would culminate in the clash over the New Deal, the Court
attempted to articulate substantive limits on the federal commerce
power in cases such as United States v. E.C. Knight Co. and Carter v.
Carter Coal Co.33
reelected, and so they want to be able to point to accomplishments, problems they have
solved for their constituents.  If the federal government takes away and itself solves
problems that state legislatures could have handled on their own, state legislators will be
displeased and select different senators.  Giving senatorial selection to the people, how-
ever, eliminates this mechanism for choosing between state and federal regulation, since
the people just want problems solved and probably care very little whether the solution
comes from the state or federal government.  For further discussion, see Jay S. Bybee,
Ulysses at the Mast: Democracy, Federalism, and the Sirens’ Song of the Seventeenth Amendment, 91
NW. U. L. REV. 500, 535–36 (1997).
28 This term refers to the Court that decided Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
29 247 U.S. 251, 276–77 (1918).
30 259 U.S. 20, 43 (1922).
31 See, e.g., Hammer, 247 U.S. at 277–78 (Holmes, J. dissenting) (noting the statute at
issue regulated “carriage of certain goods in interstate” commerce and was “clearly within
the Congress’s constitutional power”).
32 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (1 Wheat) 316, 423 (1819) (stating that “should
Congress, under the pretext of executing its powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of
objects not entrusted to the government; it would become the painful duty of this tribu-
nal . . . to say, that such an act was not the law of the land”).
33 United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12 (1895) (holding that “[c]ommerce
succeeds to manufacture, and is not a part of it”); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238,
307 (1936) (invalidating federal regulation that sought to regulate “local” activity which
affected interstate commerce only “indirectly”); see also, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp.
v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 546 (1935) (holding that Congress could not regulate activi-
ties that affect interstate commerce indirectly).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\100-3\CRN302.txt unknown Seq: 9 18-MAR-15 8:28
2015] BAIT AND SWITCH 611
Both these ventures failed.  The doctrine that the Supreme Court
would look into the minds of the legislature and reach conclusions
about subjective intent that might void a formally valid law was diffi-
cult to implement, and the Court abandoned it.34  Likewise, the ques-
tion of whether a given activity’s effect on interstate commerce was
sufficiently “direct and material” to subject it to regulation turned out
to be one that legislatures were much better at answering than
courts.35  The Seventeenth Amendment had certainly taken away one
reason to trust Congress’s judgment on matters of federalism, but the
New Deal Court did not find sufficient reason to distrust it on eco-
nomic issues, and it acquiesced.36
The Civil Rights era featured another expansion of federal
power.  The reach of the federal government under the New Deal had
been broad, but the purposes of New Deal legislation were generally
plainly economic.37  The federal antidiscrimination legislation en-
acted during the 1960s, by contrast, seemed to be aimed at racial dis-
crimination primarily as a moral evil, rather than an economic
problem.38  Such legislation might have been justified as an exercise
34 See, e.g., Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513–14 (1937) (stating that
“[i]nquiry into the hidden motives which may move Congress to exercise a power constitu-
tionally conferred upon it is beyond the competency of courts”).
35 As Justice Robert Jackson put it in a letter to then-Circuit Judge Sherman Minton,
If we were to be brutally frank . . . I suspect what we would say is that in any
case where Congress thinks there is an effect on interstate commerce, the
Court will accept that judgment. . . . When we admit that it is an economic
matter, we pretty nearly admit that it is not a matter which courts may
judge.
Letter from Robert H. Jackson to Sherman Minton 1–2 (Dec. 21, 1942), Box 125, Jackson
MSS, LC.
36 The precise reason for this is unclear, and it may certainly have had something to
do with President Roosevelt’s Court-packing threat.  But it might also have been attributa-
ble to an appreciation, sharpened by the Great Depression, of the costs of judicial error
should courts strike down necessary economic regulation and a judgment that, as Marshall
argued in McCulloch, questions of the limits of federal power (rather than individual rights)
did not present an urgent case for judicial supervision.  See McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 401 (not-
ing that judicial deference was appropriate for cases “in the decision of which the great
principles of liberty are not concerned, but the respective powers of those who are equally
the representatives of the people, are to be adjusted”).  For discussions of the so-called
“switch in time,” see, for example, BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE
STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 3–4 (1998); G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTI-
TUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 11 (2000).
37 Even United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941), which noted that “[t]he
motive and purpose of a regulation of interstate commerce are matters for the legislative
judgment upon the exercise of which the Constitution places no restriction and over which
the courts are given no control,” prefaced that observation with an explanation of how the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) protected commerce. See id. at 109–10 (discussing the
FLSA).
38 See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 257 (1964) (observ-
ing that “Congress was legislating against moral wrongs”).
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of Congress’s power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment,39 but
instead the Court upheld it under the Commerce Clause.40  This bless-
ing of pretextual Commerce Clause legislation might seem surprising,
and out of keeping with the Court’s normal practice of pushing back
against new assertions of federal power.  It may be explained by the
somewhat unusual circumstances of the Civil Rights era.  Atypically,
the Court had taken a bold step in the name of racial equality in
Brown, provoking a sharp backlash.41  It needed the support of the
other branches of the federal government to enforce that decision (it
needed, in fact, federal troops42), and it is hard to imagine that the
Court would strike down federal legislation supporting its own contro-
versial decision.
The absence of a judicial pushback in the Civil Rights era might
explain why the next stirrings of federalism came more or less on
their own rather than in response to any obvious expansion of federal
power.43  Beginning in the 1970s and continuing to the present day,
the so-called New Federalism has sought to set meaningful limits on
federal authority.44  Some of these efforts, like the Court’s attempt to
identify islands of state activity immune to federal regulation, have
been explicitly abandoned.45  Others, like the ban on Commerce
Clause regulation of intrastate noneconomic activity, have been weak-
39 See, e.g., id. at 279 (Douglas, J., concurring) (expressing a preference for upholding
as Fourteenth Amendment enforcement legislation); Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 309
(1969) (Black, J., dissenting) (“I could and would agree with the Court’s holding in this
case had Congress in the 1964 Civil Rights Act based its power to bar racial discrimination
at places of public accommodations upon § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).  Doing so
would presumably have required the Court to overrule the Civil Rights Cases.  The federal
Department of Justice hinted at the possibility in its amicus brief, but the Court declined.
See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 19–20, Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298
(1969), 1969 WL 136812 (describing the authority of the Civil Rights Cases as “eroded by
later decisions”).
40 See, e.g., Daniel, 395 U.S. at 309; Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 276–77.
41 See, e.g., Carlos A. Ball, The Backlash Thesis and Same-Sex Marriage: Learning from
Brown v. Board of Education and Its Aftermath, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1493, 1505–10
(2006) (describing the backlash against Brown).
42 See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80
VA. L. REV. 7, 112–14 (1994) (describing federal military intervention in Little Rock,
Arkansas).
43 Viewing the New Federalism as a delayed pushback against the Civil Rights era
might also explain why ostensibly federalist decisions look like what Jed Rubenfeld has
called the anti-antidiscrimination agenda. See Jed Rubenfeld, The Anti-Antidiscrimination
Agenda, 111 YALE L.J. 1141, 1142–44 (2002).  The Rehnquist Court was willing, as the
Warren Court was not, to dissociate itself from federal promotion of equality. See also, e.g.,
J. Clay Smith, Jr., Shifts of Federalism and Its Implications for Civil Rights, 39 HOWARD L.J. 737,
745 (1996) (suggesting that Lopez might portend challenges to civil rights laws).
44 For a survey of the Court’s work, see, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Just Blowing Smoke?
Politics, Doctrine, and the Federalist Revival After Gonzales v. Raich, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 1,
49–50 (2005).
45 See, e.g., Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 855–56 (1976), overruled by
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 557 (1985).
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ened by exceptions and remain largely derelict.46  Some more recent
decisions retain the potential to have significant consequences, but
their potential is for now only that.47  For the most part, judicial
pushback against expanding federal power has been a failure. The
following section explores why this is so.
B. Faces of Federalism
Chronologically, what we see looking at the Court’s ventures into
federalism is that the Court tends to offer initial resistance to expan-
sions of federal power but then eventually back down.  The Slaughter-
House decision still stands, but its significance may be relatively minor,
as the Supreme Court eventually used the Due Process and Equal Pro-
tection Clauses to achieve most of the results that would have been
appropriate under the Privileges or Immunities Clause.48  The
Lochner-era decisions limiting the federal commerce and taxing pow-
ers have been overruled, as have the similar New Deal–era ones.49
Then-Justice Rehnquist’s opening federalist salvo, the recognition of
specially protected areas of state activity immune to federal regula-
tion, was also overruled only nine years later.50  More recent federalist
46 The Supreme Court has allowed Congress to regulate intrastate noncommercial
activity if such regulation is part of a larger scheme aimed at commercial activity. See
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 26–33 (2005).  It has also suggested that intrastate noncom-
mercial activity can be reached by a statute with a jurisdictional hook that establishes an
effect on commerce in each case to which it is applied. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 561–62 (1995).  Lower courts have shown no inclination to extend the Morrison/Lopez
limits. See Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, Lower Court Readings of Lopez, or
What If the Supreme Court Held a Constitutional Revolution and Nobody Came?, 2000 WIS. L. REV.
369, 385 & n.85 (2000).  And the refrain of the opponents of the Affordable Care Act that
if the individual mandate was upheld, there would be no limits on federal power, suggests
that Morrison and Lopez—which are, after all, limits on federal power—are not viewed as
especially meaningful.  For the refrain, see, e.g., Brief for State Respondents on the Mini-
mum Coverage Provision at 27–28, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct.
2566 (2012) (No. 11–398), 2012 WL 392550.
47 Recent decisions that could produce meaningful change include Nat’l Fed’n of
Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 (2012), and Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct.
2612, 2631 (2013).
48 See Kermit Roosevelt III, What if Slaughter-House Had Been Decided Differently?, 45 IND.
L.  REV.  61, 63 (2011). Slaughter-House was not without consequence, however.  When the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses were reinterpreted to assume the role that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause was initially intended to play, their own initial purposes
faded into the background. Id. at 70.  In particular, equal enforcement of state laws has
come to play a marginal role in equal protection jurisprudence, rather than the core role
the Reconstruction Congress envisaged. See id. at 68.  This shift has made the Morrison
prohibition on regulating private parties via Section 5 seem more plausible than it should.
See id. at 69–70, 76–77.
49 See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116 (1941) (overruling Hammer);
Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 514 (1937) (abandoning pretext analysis for tax-
ing power).
50 See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 557 (1985) (overrul-
ing Usery).
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decisions persist, but, as this section will discuss, most seem unlikely to
bear fruit.
If we examine the doctrines in terms of their substantive impact,
a complementary picture emerges: the rules that impose meaningful
limits on federal power are precisely the ones that the Court ends up
abandoning.  With respect to the Commerce Clause, there have been
several different eras of judicial pushback and acquiescence.  In the
Lochner era, and during its time resisting the New Deal, the Court cre-
ated limits on the commerce power that were meaningful.51  Inquir-
ing into Congress’s motive, and restricting it to the regulation of
activities that directly and substantially affected interstate commerce,
curtailed federal authority in a significant way.  But the Court lacked
the political will or power to maintain those limits.
During the New Federalism, Morrison and Lopez announced that
Congress could not use the commerce power to regulate intrastate
noncommercial activity.52  But exceptions have emerged. Congress
can reach such activity if doing so is necessary to effectuate a broader
scheme that aims at commercial activity, and perhaps if it includes a
jurisdictional hook ensuring a connection to interstate commerce in
every case.53  Lower courts have made no real effort to develop the
Morrison/Lopez analysis, and the Supreme Court has not revisited the
doctrine except to narrow it.54
The 2012 decision about the Affordable Care Act, National Federa-
tion of Independent Business v. Sebelius, seems unlikely to mark a real
change, dramatic though it was. Healthcare is unique, as the defend-
ers of the Act argued,55 and Congress is not likely to find a need to
51 See, e.g., Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20, 39 (1922) (citing Hammer as
another limit on the Commerce Clause).
52 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 626 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549, 566 (1995).
53 See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17–18 (2005) (describing comprehensive scheme
exception).  After Lopez, Congress reenacted the Gun-Free School Zones Act with a proviso
limiting its application to guns that “ha[ve] moved in or that otherwise affect[ ] interstate
or foreign commerce.”  United States v. Danks, 221 F.3d 1037, 1038–39 (8th Cir. 1999)
(per curiam) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (2006)).  This version has survived lower
court challenges. See, e.g., id.
54 See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Is Morrison Dead?: Assessing a Supreme Drug (Law) Over-
dose, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 751, 765, 777 (2005) (concluding that Raich repudiated Lopez
and Morrison); Thomas W. Merrill, Rescuing Federalism After Raich: The Case for Clear State-
ment Rules, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 823, 844 (2005) (“Lopez and Morrison have been largely
confined to their facts.”); Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, What Hath Raich
Wrought? Five Takes, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 915, 932 (2005) (expressing doubt that “a
robust judicially-enforceable federalism has much future left” after Raich).
55 See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2623 (2012)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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impose a similar mandate in the future.  And even if it did, as Sebelius
itself shows, it could do so through the taxing power.56
With respect to the taxing and spending powers, the story is simi-
lar.  The motive analysis that the Court promised, or threatened, dur-
ing the Lochner era would have amounted to a meaningful limit.57  But
the cases that offered that limit have been overruled.58  In its place we
have the toothless test of South Dakota v. Dole,59 and the nebulous
shadows of Sebelius.60  The limit suggested by Sebelius might turn out to
be meaningful, but past history suggests that such unclear rules do not
prove durable.  (Meaningful limits on the spending power would be
quite significant, however, since they would revitalize the anticom-
mandeering doctrines announced in New York v. United States61 and
Printz v. United States.62  The federal government may neither com-
mand the states to legislate, nor order state officials to enforce federal
law, those cases hold.63  Yet if Dole remains the law, the federal govern-
ment need only threaten to withdraw marginally related federal fund-
ing to compel compliance.64)
The Court’s treatment of the Section 5 power, however, has been
different.  Here, the Court has been substantially more forceful, and
more successful, in pushing back against Congress.  In City of Boerne v.
Flores and its progeny, the Court has required that congressional en-
forcement legislation be “congruen[t] and proportional[ ]” to the
constitutional violation Congress seeks to deter or remedy.65  And in
Morrison, it ruled that the Section 5 power could not be used to regu-
late private parties.66  These tests are not toothless; they have struck
down some quite significant laws.67  Moreover, they appear durable;
the Court has given no signs of abandoning them.  Almost alone
56 See id. at 2593–600 (finding the taxing power to be the source of authority to im-
pose the individual mandate).
57 See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 265 (1918).
58 See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116 (1941) (overruling Hammer).
59 483 U.S. 203, 207–08 (1987).
60 For perhaps the best analysis of the puzzle of conditional spending, see Mitchell
Berman, Coercion, Compulsion, and the Medicaid Expansion: A Study in the Doctrine of Unconsti-
tutional Conditions, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1283, 1286–87 (2013).
61 505 U.S. 144, 161–63 (1992).
62 521 U.S. 898, 929–33 (1997).
63 See New York, 505 U.S. at 161–63; Printz, 521 U.S. at 929–33.
64 See 483 U.S. at 207–08.
65 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997) (discussing congruence and
proportionality); see also Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 372–74
(2001) (striking down portions of the ADA for failing to satisfy congruence and propor-
tionality test); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 82–83 (2000) (same for portions of
the ADEA).
66 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 621–22 (2000).
67 Morrison struck down the civil rights remedy of the Violence Against Women Act
(VAWA); Garrett and Kimel, the application of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), respectively, to obtain money
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among the sources of federal authority, then, the Section 5 power has
been limited in a meaningful and lasting way.68  The next section of-
fers some thoughts as to why this might be.
C. Doctrinal Desiderata
One reason that the Court has generally backed away from its
federalist interventions is that the Court tends not to fight a dominant
political coalition for very long. The Court is harder than the elected
branches for political movements to capture, but it is not invulnera-
ble.  Justices do not live forever, so a movement that holds the elected
branches for long enough can eventually stock the Court with its sup-
porters.69  The nationalist side of the federal-state struggle typically
has numbers on its side, and so it is not surprising that it tends to
prevail in individual battles at the Court.  Since winning these battles
at least sometimes requires the expansion of federal power, it is also
not surprising that the Court has tended to support that expansion
over time.
But there are other, less political reasons why the federalist side
has tended to lose.  For one thing, the Constitution simply gives us
very little in the way of explicit states’ rights for the Court to protect.
States are guaranteed equal representation in the Senate.70  They are
protected from dismemberment.71  Apart from that, the text of the
Constitution largely supports the view that the safeguards of federal-
ism are a matter of process, not result.72
damages from state entities. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 621–22; Garrett, 531 U.S. at 372–74;
Kimel, 528 U.S. at 82–83.
68 The Eleventh Amendment is another restriction on federal power, and it is one
that the Court has been relatively willing to enforce.  But it operates in a quite limited
sphere; it matters only with respect to the award of money damages to individuals.  That is
not insignificant, but not necessarily a threat to federal aims: if it deems the issue impor-
tant enough, the federal government can always bring suit in its own name.  Current Elev-
enth Amendment doctrine creates some odd anomalies.  For instance, an individual can
recover damages from California in the courts and under the law of coequal sovereign
Nevada, but not in the courts and under the law of the hierarchically superior federal
sovereign. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 496–99 (2003).  But in terms of the
larger federal-state balance, it is a pinprick.
69 This phenomenon is generally taken to be the basis for then-Justice Rehnquist’s
prediction in Garcia that the dissent’s view would someday enjoy majority support. See
Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1486 n.3 (1994) (describing
Rehnquist’s dissent as “lacking only a footnote attaching an actuarial table to indicate how
soon the Court could expect to lose its older, liberal members”).  Even without replace-
ment, Justices may change in office in ways that bring them more in line with dominant
political and constitutional opinion.
70 U.S. CONST. art. V.
71 See id. art. IV, § 3.
72 See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550–51 (1985).  Un-
deniably, the Seventeenth Amendment has undermined that structure.  The hard question
is what, if anything, judges should do in response. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 652 (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that “[t]he Seventeenth Amendment may indeed have lessened the
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The lack of clear text to enforce makes things harder, though the
Court’s sovereign immunity jurisprudence shows that it is not an
insuperable barrier.73  More serious is the problem that decisions
about the appropriate balance between state and federal power tend
to be political.  Ideally, the federal government would be able to act
when a federal solution is needed and able to hold back when a mat-
ter can be left to the states.74  But what this requires is a Congress with
very broad powers and also a sense of self-restraint and a respect for
state autonomy.  The Court can give us the first of these, but not the
second, and it has not tried to.  (In the wake of Lopez, which offered a
prime example of an unnecessary federal law in the Gun-Free School
Zones Act, some scholars suggested process-based restraints as a way to
improve congressional decisionmaking.75 The Court never took up
the suggestion.)  Selection of senators by state legislatures might have,
but the Seventeenth Amendment took that away.  In consequence, the
Court is left trying to create rules that will reach the results that a wise
and state-respecting Congress would have.  But it seems quite unlikely
that any rules will do so, at least any judicially administrable rules that
are recognizable as legal doctrine.76
Successful doctrine must meet at least two distinct require-
ments.77  First, it must work.  It must reach results that are consistent
with constitutional meaning or at least that further the purpose of
enthusiasm of the Senate to represent the States as discrete sovereignties, but the Amend-
ment did not convert the judiciary into an alternate shield against the commerce power”).
73 See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 728 (1999) (“[S]overeign immunity derives
not from the Eleventh Amendment but from the structure of the original Constitution
itself.”).
74 It would act, as the Constitutional Convention voted it should, when “the States are
separately incompetent.” See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at
131–32 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966).  The “separately incompetent” language went to
the Committee on Detail, which changed it to the enumeration of Article I, Section 8. See
Robert L. Stern, That Commerce Which Concerns More States Than One, 47 HARV. L. REV. 1335,
1340 (1934).
75 See, e.g., Philip P. Frickey, The Fool on the Hill: Congressional Findings, Constitutional
Adjudication, and United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 695, 697 (1996);
Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 125,
207–14 (1995).
76 Allowing Congress to legislate for the general interests of the union and when the
states are separately incompetent comes close, and this wording of legislative power was
actually voted on by the Convention. See Stern, supra note 74, at 1340.  But the judgment
this calls for lies much more within congressional than judicial competence, so having
courts second-guess the legislative judgment will be awkward at best.  For general discus-
sions of the collective action theory, see Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action
Federalism: A General Theory of Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115 (2010); Neil S. Siegel,
Collective Action Federalism and Its Discontents, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1937 (2013).
77 For a discussion of doctrine creation, see generally ROOSEVELT, supra note 17, at
22–36.
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constitutional provisions.78  To do this, it must choose the right ques-
tions to ask, and it must also allocate those questions to the deci-
sionmaker most likely to get them right.79  Second, it must be
workable.  It must provide guidance to lower courts and government
officials; it must be clear, predictable, and easy to apply.80
Crafting federalism doctrine that fits both these desiderata turns
out to be quite hard.  Doctrine that constrains in a meaningful way
often turns on questions falling within legislative rather than judicial
competence.  That was the case with most of the Lochner-era limits,
and the Usery creation of islands of state sovereignty as well.81  On such
78 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966), for instance, departs dramatically
from constitutional meaning (the Constitution plainly does not contain the Miranda warn-
ing), but it does so in a way that furthers the purpose of the underlying provision. See
generally David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190 (1988)
(arguing that prophylactic rules are central and necessary to constitutional law).
79 Suppose, for instance, that a core purpose of the commerce power is to allow Con-
gress to protect and promote interstate commerce.  Whether a given activity substantially
affects interstate commerce is an appropriate question for doctrine to ask, then, since the
regulation of such an activity will plausibly be an “appropriate means to the attainment of a
legitimate end, the exercise of the granted power of Congress to regulate interstate com-
merce.”  United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118 (1941).  But that is a question that
Congress is much better at answering than the Court, and it is thus equally important to
doctrinal legitimacy that the question be committed initially to Congress, with deferential
judicial review. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 628 (2000) (Souter, J., dissent-
ing) (“The fact of such a substantial effect is not an issue for the courts in the first in-
stance, . . . but for the Congress, whose institutional capacity for gathering evidence and
taking testimony far exceeds ours.”); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981) (“The court must defer to a congressional finding that a
regulated activity affects interstate commerce, if there is any rational basis for such a find-
ing.”).  The abandonment of the Lochner-era due process jurisprudence, I have argued, was
driven by very similar analysis on the issue of the public interest. See Kermit Roosevelt III,
Forget the Fundamentals: Fixing Substantive Due Process, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 983, 989–91
(2006).  The Court has maintained consistently that legislation must serve the public inter-
est, but it has moved from the view that judges can identify the public interest to the view
that “when the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms well-
nigh conclusive.”  Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).  For yet another example,
consider the progress from Plessy to Brown.  Both those decisions ask whether a particular
classification is oppressive or invidious; what changes is that Plessy’s belief that this is a
question on which deference is appropriate is replaced by Brown’s more suspicious per-
spective. See Kermit Roosevelt III, Judicial Supremacy, Judicial Activism: Cooper v. Aaron and
Parents Involved, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 1191, 1202–04 (2008).  I have argued elsewhere at
greater length that the issue of judicial activism is best understood in terms of the appro-
priate level of deference given by the Court to the constitutional conclusions of other
actors. See ROOSEVELT, supra note 17, at 37–47.
80 See generally, e.g., Richard A. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitu-
tional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1274 (2006) (discussing the relationship between consti-
tutional norms, meaning, doctrine, and the desire for judicially manageable standards).
81 See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 548 (1985) (overrul-
ing National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), and expressing doubt “that courts
ultimately can identify principled constitutional limitations on the scope of Congress’
Commerce Clause powers over the States merely by relying on a priori definitions of state
sovereignty”).
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issues, deference to the legislature is the natural stance, but deferen-
tial application robs the rules of their practical significance.82
Conversely, limits that judges are good at enforcing frequently do
not impose meaningful and nonarbitrary constraints.  The Morrison/
Lopez carve-out may be a manageable rule (though defining the limits
of economic activity is a challenge83), but it now looks largely sym-
bolic.84  The New York/Printz rules are clear but also easy to circumvent
via the spending power.85  As far as the commerce, taxing, and spend-
ing powers are concerned, doctrine that truly constrains tends not to
last.86  This is, I suggest, because the relevant questions are more
within legislative than judicial competence, and meaningful judicial
supervision usually comes to be seen as unjustified.
Yet as noted before, Section 5 is an exception.  The Court has
been more aggressive, and more successful, in limiting the Section 5
power.  There is an obvious reason for this: rather than turning on
economic analysis, Section 5 questions frequently involve constitu-
tional interpretation. This different focus explains greater judicial as-
sertiveness in two distinct but related ways.  First, while the Supreme
Court typically views itself as less competent than Congress to decide
complicated economic issues, it views itself as substantially better, and
uniquely authorized, to interpret the Constitution.87  Second, while
the Court may not care very much about preserving state authority for
its own sake, it certainly does care about preserving its own author-
ity.88  A deferential approach to Section 5 legislation can seem to cede
82 Likewise, understanding the commerce power as allowing Congress to regulate any
activity that substantially affects interstate commerce, at least if it does so for a commercial
purpose, is plausible. See Kermit Roosevelt III, Constitutional Calcification: How the Law Be-
comes What the Court Does, 91 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1693–99 (2006).  But Congress’s superiority
in determining the existence of substantial effects pushes the Court toward a deferential
“rational basis” standard for reviewing the congressional determination, which leads to a
near-total lack of judicially enforceable limits.
83 See generally Allen Ides, Economic Activity as a Proxy for Federalism: Intuition and Reason
in United States v. Morrison, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 563, 566–70 (2001) (discussing poten-
tial definitions of “economic activity”).
84 See Adler, supra note 54, at 765, 777; Merrill, supra note 54, at 844; Reynolds & R
Denning, supra note 54, at 932.
85 See Matthew D. Adler & Seth F. Kreimer, The New Etiquette of Federalism: New York,
Printz, and Yeskey, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 104–05 (1999).
86 See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 557 (1985)
(overruling Usery).
87 See generally Larry Kramer, Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 14 (2001)
(“The Rehnquist Court no longer views itself as first among equals, but has instead staked
its claim to being the only institution empowered to speak with authority when it comes to
the meaning of the Constitution.”).
88 A hallmark of the Rehnquist Court’s ostensibly federalist decisions was that on
closer inspection, many seemed to be driven by a concern for judicial supremacy. See
Kermit Roosevelt III, Wrong, But Not Too Right, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Mar.–Apr. 2005, at 37 (argu-
ing that “[f]ederalism has been hijacked by judicial supremacy”), available at http://www.le
galaffairs.org/issues/March-April-2005/feature_roosevelt_marapr05.msp.  Indeed, the re-
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interpretive power to Congress, which the Court is generally disin-
clined to do.
With the Section 5 power, the Court has created two significant
rules, the Boerne congruence and proportionality test, and the Morrison
ban on regulation of private parties.89  Congruence and proportional-
ity asks whether, in light of the existing evidence of state violations of
constitutional requirements, the federal enforcement legislation goes
too far beyond those requirements.90  In my view, this is perfectly
sound doctrine, with one important caveat.  When the Court com-
pares enforcement legislation to the requirements of the Constitution
it should look at the Constitution, rather than the rules the Court has
created to enforce it.  It should compare enforcement legislation to
meaning, rather than doctrine.91
The Morrison limit, on the other hand, should be rejected at the
first opportunity.  Other scholars have suggested that it is wrong about
the meaning or the original understanding of Section 5 or that it erro-
neously ignores the Citizenship Clause of Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.92  I am sympathetic to these arguments, and I will revisit
some of them briefly in later sections.  But Morrison does not present
its rule as derived from a first-impression analysis of Section 5.  It re-
lies instead on the Civil Rights Cases, and my main aim in this Article is
to show how deceptive and baseless that claim is.93
peated assertion that the commerce power must have limits because an enumeration pre-
supposes something not enumerated, see, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616
n.7 (2000), shows just this concern.  The Court is not satisfied with the idea that there are
some things Congress would never do—raise the minimum wage to $1000 per hour, for
instance, or require every citizen to purchase broccoli; it demands that there be some
things the Court would stop Congress from doing.  That is, it is not concerned with the
kinds of limits that the political process might create; it considers only judicially enforcea-
ble limits to be real.
89 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 620–22; City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519–20
(1997).
90 See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519–20.
91 See Roosevelt, supra note 82, at 1680–83.
92 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV.
26, 104–06 (2000); Jack M. Balkin, The Reconstruction Power, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1801,
1833–37 (2010).
93 In the immediate aftermath of Morrison, some academic commentary questioned its
use of precedent. See, e.g., Evan Caminker, Private Remedies for Public Wrongs Under Section 5,
33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1351, 1361–64 (2000); Samuel Estreicher & Margaret H. Lemos, The
Section Five Mystique, Morrison, and the Future of Federal Antidiscrimination Law, 2000 SUP. CT.
REV. 109, 145–50.  But those discussions seem not to have stuck.  There was also an attempt
to read Morrison as simply applying Boerne’s congruence and proportionality test, rather
than announcing a bright-line rule against regulating private parties via Section 5. See
Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation
After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L. J. 441, 445 (2000).  This reading has been largely
abandoned.  It is now relatively common to describe the Civil Rights Cases as Morrison por-
trayed them, and most recent analyses of the Section 5 power spend little time questioning
that description. See, e.g., Michael Zimmer, Wal-Mart v. Dukes: Taking the Protection out of
Protected Classes, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 409, 416 n.28 (2012) (stating that “the Rehnquist
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\100-3\CRN302.txt unknown Seq: 19 18-MAR-15 8:28
2015] BAIT AND SWITCH 621
II
MORRISON
A. The Background
Starting in 1991, Congress held several years of hearings on the
problem of violence against women.  Testimony from victims, law
professors, and various participants in state justice systems, as well as
task force reports on gender bias from twenty-one states,94 suggested
to Congress that certain violations of state law—most notably, violence
against women by people they knew—were not receiving proper re-
dress.  Some state laws discriminated based on gender, and even
gender-neutral laws were enforced unequally.95  In consequence, in
the words of a House Report,96 “bias and discrimination in the [state]
criminal justice system often deprive[ ] victims of crimes of violence
motivated by gender of equal protection of the laws and the redress to
which they are entitled.”97
To solve this problem, Congress created a federal civil cause of
action for people who were the victims of gender-motivated vio-
lence.98  Rather than the generic state tort claims that had proved
ineffectual, the civil rights remedy was aimed precisely at gender-moti-
vated violence.99  The specific targeting of such conduct, Congress
hoped, would eliminate the tendency of finders of fact to discount
acquaintance violence as not a “real” offense, to make them see it, in
the words of then-Senator Joseph Biden, as “a crime, not a quarrel.”100
Court [in Morrison] reaffirmed the holding of the Civil Rights Cases that Congress lacks
power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to reach private action”); Mehrdad
Payandah, Constitutional Aesthetics: Appending Amendments to the United States Constitution, 25
BYU J. PUB. L. 87, 126 (“[I]n 1883 the Supreme Court held in the Civil Rights Cases that
Congress had no authority to enact laws against private discrimination under
the . . . Fourteenth Amendment.”); Mark D. Rosen, From Exclusivity to Concurrence, 94 MINN.
L. REV. 1051, 1111 n.316 (2010) (describing Morrison as “reaffirming Civil Rights Cases’
holding that Congress’s Section Five powers extend only to state action, not to ‘private
persons’”); Francisco M. Ugarte, Reconstruction Redux: Rehnquist, Morrison, and the Civil
Rights Cases, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 481, 482 (2006) (describing Reconstruction cases
as holding “that Congress did not have the power to restrict the discriminatory behavior of
private actors”).
94 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 629–30 & nn.3–7 (Souter, J., dissenting).
95 See id. at 620.
96 See generally Victoria F. Nourse, Where Violence and Equality Meet: The Violence Against
Women Act’s Civil Rights Remedy, 11 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 9–12 (1996) (describing findings
from Senate hearings).
97 H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 103–711, at 385 (1994).
98 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) (1994).
99 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 653–54 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The Act accordingly offers
a federal civil rights remedy aimed exactly at violence against women, as an alternative to
the generic state tort causes of action found to be poor tools of action by the state task
forces.”)
100 See Joseph R. Biden, Domestic Violence: A Crime, Not a Quarrel, TRIAL, at 59 (June
1993).
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Equally important, the federal cause of action allowed victims to file
suit in federal court, rather than in the state justice systems that the
task force reports had found to be pervasively biased.101
The facts of Morrison are of the sort frequently offered to support
the need for the civil rights remedy.102  Christy Brzonkala, a freshman
at Virginia Tech, filed a complaint under the school’s Sexual Assault
Policy against two varsity football players, Antonio Morrison and James
Crawford, alleging that they had raped her.103  During the school’s
hearing, Morrison admitted that Brzonkala had twice told him “no”
but that he had engaged in sexual contact with her anyway.104  The
school found Morrison guilty of sexual assault and suspended him for
two semesters.105  Without explanation, it later changed the offense
description to “using abusive language.”106  On appeal, the two-
semester suspension was deemed “excessive” and set aside.107  Upon
learning that Morrison would be returning to school, Brzonkala
dropped out.108  Crawford did not confess. The school found the evi-
dence against him insufficient, and he received no punishment.109
Neither man was ever charged by state authorities.
Brzonkala later sued Morrison and Crawford in federal court,
seeking damages under the Violence Against Women Act’s civil rights
remedy.110  The district court struck down the civil rights remedy as
going beyond the powers of Congress under either the Commerce
Clause or Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.111  A panel of the
Fourth Circuit reversed that decision, upholding the statute, but upon
rehearing en banc, the full Fourth Circuit also found the civil rights
remedy unconstitutional.112  Congress could not use the Commerce
Clause to regulate intrastate noncommercial activity, the Fourth Cir-
cuit held, and it could not use Section 5 to regulate private parties.113
101 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 653 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“It was against this record of
failure at the state level that the Act was passed to provide the choice of a federal forum in
place of the state-court systems found inadequate to stop gender-biased violence.”).
102 The following description is drawn from the Supreme Court’s account. See Morri-
son, 529 U.S. at 602–03.
103 See id. at 603.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 603–04.
109 Id. at 603.
110 Id. at 604.
111 Id.
112 Id. at 604–05.
113 See Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst., 169 F.3d 820, 889 (4th Cir. 1999).
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B. Morrison at the Supreme Court
At the Supreme Court level, much of the argument was devoted
to the Commerce Clause,114 which is not the main focus of this Arti-
cle.  Indeed, my claim is that despite the attention it received, the
Commerce Clause issue is less important.  The intrastate noncommer-
cial carve-out we associate with Morrison means little in practice.
Morrison’s treatment of Section 5, by contrast, is important: as I will
argue later, prohibiting the use of Section 5 to regulate private parties
cuts the heart out of Congress’s power to enforce the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.115  If states fail to enforce their laws to protect certain
groups, federal legislation offering alternative remedies is the most
appropriate, and perhaps the only, means by which Congress can
respond.
This theory of Section 5, what scholars have called the “state neg-
lect” theory,116 was the argument offered by the United States in the
Morrison briefing.117  The theory has two parts.  First, there is what I
will call the “duty to protect” element.  This asserts that a state’s fail-
ure to enforce its laws for the benefit of some group—a failure to
protect them equally—is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.118
In the case of VAWA Congress had received evidence and made find-
ings that such constitutional violations were occurring: state judicial
systems were failing to offer equal protection to female victims of gen-
der-motivated violence.119  Section 5 authorized it to enact an “appro-
114 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607–19 (rejecting Commerce Clause as basis for VAWA).
115 See discussion infra Part III.D.
116 See Pamela Brandwein, The Civil Rights Cases and the Lost Language of State Neglect, in
THE SUPREME COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 275, 275–76 (Ronald Kahn &
Ken I. Kersch, eds., 2006).
117 See Brief for the United States at 36–45, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598
(2000) (Nos. 99–5 and 99–29), 1999 WL 1037259.
118 As I will describe more fully infra Part IV, this component of the state neglect
theory has been universally accepted throughout American legal history, though it has
frequently been viewed as a peripheral part of equal protection. See generally Christopher
R. Green, The Original Sense of the (Equal) Protection Clause: Pre-enactment History, 19 GEO.
MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 1 (2008) (arguing that history proves “duty-to-protect” rather than
“improper classification” is the proper rationale behind the Equal Protection Clause)
[hereinafter Green, History]; Christopher R. Green, The Original Sense of the (Equal) Protec-
tion Clause: Subsequent Interpretation and Application, 19 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 219
(2009) (arguing postratification history proves “duty-to-protect” rather than “improper
classification” is the proper rationale behind the Equal Protection Clause) [hereinafter
Green, Application].
119 See, e.g., H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 103–711, at 385 (1994); S. REP. NO. 103–138, at 38,
41–42, 44–47 (1993); S. REP. NO. 102–197, at 39, 44–49 (1991).  James P. Turner, Acting
Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice, wrote in a
statement that “standard State tort remedies have not been sufficient in this area because
they are not tailored to remedy gender-motivated violence.” Crimes of Violence Motivated by
Gender: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Civ. & Const. Rights, 103d Cong. 96 (1993) (state-
ment of James P. Turner).  “[C]ollectively,” the Senate concluded in 1993, “these reports
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priate” enforcement measure to deter or remedy that violation.120
The second part of the state neglect theory, what I will call the “direct
regulation” element, is the assertion that regulation of private parties
(rather than state actors) may be an appropriate measure.
What other choice was there?  Congress could, in theory, have
targeted the state officials whose conduct violated the constitution: it
could have enacted a law requiring police, prosecutors, judges, and
juries to handle cases without gender bias, and perhaps giving victims
of such bias a cause of action for damages.  Such an approach would
have obvious and severe drawbacks.  It would be an enormous intru-
sion on state administration of justice—an essential state function if
ever there was one.  It would run into traditional principles of immu-
nity for most participants in the justice system.121  And it would inevi-
tably encounter substantial difficulties of proof in particular cases.
Bias works in subtle ways; who can say why a jury failed to convict or a
prosecutor declined to bring charges?
Fortunately, Congress had another option.  It could try to remedy
the deficiency in the state laws and institutions by allowing victims ac-
cess to federal law and federal courts.  This would not interfere with
the conduct of any state official, and it would not require intrusive
scrutiny of state judicial systems and futile attempts to demonstrate
bias in particular cases.  In much the same way as federal diversity ju-
risdiction simply offers a neutral alternative to potentially biased state
courts, a federal civil rights remedy would give alternatives to plaintiffs
who did not believe they could receive fair treatment in the state
system.
Which of these remedies was more appropriate?  There is no real
choice; the first option is all but unimaginable.  No one could seri-
ously suggest holding state prosecutors, judges, or jurors liable.  If
there was to be a remedy for the violation Congress identified, it had
to be of the second sort.122  That was what Congress chose, and that
was what the Court considered in Morrison.
provide overwhelming evidence that gender bias permeates the court system and that wo-
men are most often its victims.” S. REP. NO. 103–138, at 49.
120 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518 (1997) (describing enforcement
legislation as that which “deters or remedies constitutional violations”).
121 See generally Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417–29 (1976) (discussing such im-
munities); O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 500 (1974) (directing federal courts to abstain
from hearing suits aimed at “controlling or preventing the occurrence of specific events
that might take place in the course of future state criminal trials”); see also Kaufman v. Kaye,
466 F.3d 83, 86 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that abstention was required where the relief
sought would be overly “intrusive in the administration of the New York court system”).
122 If there was a choice, Congress would be entitled to make its own judgment among
the alternatives with McCulloch-type latitude. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Lawfulness of Section
5—and Thus of Section 5, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 109, 115 & n.15 (2013).
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The Morrison Court did not deny the existence of a constitutional
violation.123  It accepted the idea that biased underenforcement of
facially neutral laws could violate the Equal Protection Clause, the
duty to protect element of state neglect.124  Nor did it dispute the im-
practicality of a remedy that ran against state officials, or the efficacy
of one that ran against private parties.  Nonetheless, it rejected the
direct regulation element of the state neglect theory, pointing to a
bright-line rule that the Section 5 power could not be used against
private parties.125  The Court extracted this rule largely from the Civil
Rights Cases.126
Looking back to the Civil Rights Cases required no great leap of
imagination.  As Morrison described them, the facts of the Civil Rights
Cases offered an almost perfect parallel.  Congress perceived a prob-
lem: African Americans were being excluded from places of public
accommodation like hotels and restaurants.127  This was in part a fail-
ure of state law but more a failure of enforcement.  Most state laws
guaranteed equal access to places of public accommodation, but these
laws were not enforced on behalf of African Americans.  States were
violating their duty to protect. Morrison quoted future president and
then-Representative James Garfield:
[T]he chief complaint is not that the laws of the State are unequal,
but that even where the laws are just and equal on their face, yet, by
a systematic maladministration of them, or a neglect or refusal to
enforce their provisions, a portion of the people are denied equal
protection under them.128
How to remedy this failure of equal protection?  The 43rd Con-
gress faced the same choice that the 103rd would, and it reached the
same conclusion.  “We cannot,” said Senator Frelinghuysen, “deal with
the states or with their officials to compel proper legislation and its
enforcement; we can only deal with the offenders who violate the priv-
ileges and immunities of citizens of the United States.”129  The way to
do that, he went on, was to provide that “the injured party should have
an original action in our Federal courts . . . .”130  And so, just as the
123 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 619–20 (noting “voluminous congres-
sional record” supporting congressional finding of constitutional violations).
124 See id.
125 Id. at 621.
126 See id. at 620–23 (discussing “longstanding limitation” derived from the Civil Rights
Cases and United States v. Harris).
127 See id. at 623.
128 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 153 (1871) (statement of Rep. Garfield).
129 2 CONG. REC. 3454 (Apr. 29, 1874) (remarks of Sen. Frelinghuysen).  Frelinghuysen
here is probably referring to privileges and immunities under state law, following Justice
Field’s theory of Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities. See Roosevelt, supra
note 48, at 67–68 (explaining Field’s theory). R
130 2 CONG. REC. 3454.
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Violence Against Women Act would, the Civil Rights Act of 1875 em-
ployed direct regulation: it gave individuals who were denied equal
access a cause of action in federal court against the offending private
parties.131
In the Civil Rights Cases, the Supreme Court struck down that pro-
vision as exceeding Congress’s power to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment.132  Its decision to do so was entitled to great respect,
Morrison noted.
The force of the doctrine of stare decisis behind these decisions
stems not only from the length of time they have been on the
books, but also from the insight attributable to the Members of the
Court at that time.  Every Member had been appointed by President
Lincoln, Grant, Hayes, Garfield, or Arthur—and each of their judi-
cial appointees obviously had intimate knowledge and familiarity
with the events surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment.133
If a Court so intimately familiar with the Fourteenth Amendment
could strike down a civil rights remedy so precisely parallel to that
challenged in Morrison, then the Morrison Court could hardly be
faulted for following its example.  Christy Brzonkala’s case was “con-
trolled by” those Reconstruction-era decisions.134
Or so the Morrison opinion would have you think.  In fact, almost
everything in Morrison’s presentation of the Civil Rights Cases is mis-
leading, from its description of Congress’s rationale to its assessment
of the Court’s historical vantage point.  The Civil Rights Cases should
not be presented as good examples of the Court’s work.  If examined
closely, as the next Part will do, they have serious flaws.  They are not,
however, as bad as Morrison.
III
THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1874 AND ITS FATE
A. Arguments in Congress
Morrison’s description of the background to the Civil Rights Act of
1875 is reasonably accurate.  It is true, as Morrison notes, that members
of the 43rd Congress expressed concern over the failure of state offi-
cials to enforce their public accommodation laws in favor of racial
minorities.135  Like the 103rd Congress, they heard testimony about
the injuries individuals suffered and their inability to get redress
131 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 624–25 (describing similar purposes of Civil Rights Act of
1875 and VAWA).
132 Id. at 627.
133 Id. at 622.
134 See id. at 602.
135 See id. at 625 (citing statement of Rep. Garfield).
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under state law.136  They described this as a failure of equal protec-
tion, a constitutional violation authorizing a remedy under the en-
forcement power.137  And like the 103rd Congress, they opted to
remedy this failure of equal protection by creating a federal claim
against the private parties who violated victims’ state law rights.138
Both elements of the state neglect theory that Morrison rejected can
indeed be found, at least in germinal form, in the statements of the
backers of the Civil Rights Act.
What about its opponents? Morrison does not quote statements
from those who spoke against the Civil Rights Act.  In part this may be
because most of their arguments would not be useful to a modern
court confronting a similar question.  The most frequent constitu-
tional objection to the Civil Rights Act was the rather general com-
plaint that it intruded into areas of traditional state sovereignty.  It
“overleaps the ramparts of the Constitution,” said Representative
Harris of Virginia, “and at once enters the arena of the States and
takes from them subjects on which they alone could legislate.”139
That complaint cannot easily be translated into Supreme Court doc-
trine.  At best, it is an appeal to the idea of inviolable areas of state
sovereignty, which the Court pursued for nine years following Usery
but abandoned in Garcia.140
Another strand of argument was that the Act impermissibly
sought to create social, rather than civil, equality.141  This appeals to
136 See, e.g., 2 CONG. REC. 1874 (Dec. 19, 1873) (statement of Rep. Lawrence) (describ-
ing the case of William Smith, “expelled from a railroad-car in one of the Southern States
for no reason except his color, and . . . unable as yet to get any redress”).
137 See, e.g., 2 CONG. REC. 414 (Jan. 6, 1874) (statement of Rep. Lawrence) (noting the
centrality of “the idea that if a State omits or neglects to secure the enforcement of equal
rights, that it ‘denies’ the equal protection of the laws within the meaning of the four-
teenth amendment”); id. (noting that “[t]he power to secure equal civil rights by ‘appro-
priate legislation’ is an express power; and Congress, therefore, is the exclusive judge of
the proper means to employ” (citing McCulloch)); 3 CONG. REC. 940 (Feb. 3, 1875) (state-
ment of Sen. Butler) (noting that “there are portions of the country where there is not any
law [that] can be enforced in favor of a colored man”); id. (“we put the case in the United
States courts where the man is likely to get justice”).  For further development of the “state
neglect” concept, see Brandwein, supra note 116, at 275–76. R
138 See 2 CONG. REC. 3454 (Apr. 29, 1874) (remarks of Sen. Frelinghuysen) (“As to the
civil remedies . . . as you cannot reach the Legislatures, the injured party should have an
original action in our Federal courts, so that by injunction or by the recovery of damages
he could have relief against the party who under color of such law is guilty of infringing his
rights.”).
139 See, e.g., 2 CONG. REC. 376 (Jan. 5, 1874) (statement of Rep. Harris).
140 See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 552 (1985) (“State
sovereign interests, then, are more properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent
in the structure of the federal system than by judicially created limitations on federal
power.”).
141 2 CONG. REC. 379 (Jan. 5, 1874) (statement of Rep. Stephens) (“[T]here is a vast
difference between civil rights proper and some of those social rights claimed by this
bill.”).
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the distinction between civil, social, and political rights.  But that dis-
tinction, though present in some Reconstruction-era Supreme Court
decisions, was neither particularly clear nor particularly stable.142  In
any event, it would not be available to a modern court, since the dis-
tinction has faded from our jurisprudence.
Some of the opponents’ arguments are frankly counterproduc-
tive from the modern perspective.  Representative Harris went on to
urge that members of Congress were “bound to respect [the]
prejudice . . . that the colored man was inferior to the white.”143  Rep-
resentative Ransier of South Carolina, one of a handful of African
Americans in the 43rd Congress, interjected, “I deny that.”144 Harris
responded, “I do not allow you to interrupt me.  Sit down; I am talking
to white men; I am talking to gentlemen.”145  The Morrison majority
did not, presumably, wish to invoke this strand of the opponents’
thinking.
The opponents did, however, also offer a theory much like the
one the Morrison Court adopted, denying the direct regulation ele-
ment of the state neglect theory.  Congress’s enforcement power, the
opponents argued, was drastically limited. It could respond to state
violations of the Fourteenth Amendment only by giving courts the op-
portunity to pronounce them void.  “The proper remedies,” Repre-
sentative Stephens argued, were “nothing but the judgments of
courts . . . declaring any State act in violation of the prohibitions to be
null and of no effect . . . .”146  Probably, on this theory, Congress could
not even regulate state actors. Certainly it could not impose obliga-
tions on private parties.
In the Houses of Congress, then, the debate over the Civil Rights
Act contained both the theory that the United States would offer in
defense of the Violence Against Women Act’s civil rights remedy and
142 See RICHARD A. PRIMUS, THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE OF RIGHTS 128, 156–57 (1999).
The Act’s supporters emphatically denied the charge, which suggests the indeterminacy of
the taxonomy.  See 2 CONG. REC. 427 (Jan. 6, 1874) (statement of Rep. Stowell) (stating
that “[t]here is no question of social equality in this bill”).
143 2 CONG. REC. 377 (Jan. 5, 1874) (statement of Rep. Harris).
144 Id. at 377 (statement of Rep. Ransier).
145 Id. at 377 (statement of Rep. Harris).
146 Id. at 380 (statement of Rep. Stephens). See also 2 CONG. REC. 4162–63 (May 22,
1874) (statement of Sen. Kelly) (arguing that the enforcement power “was simply giving
the authority to Congress to make a case and present it so that it might be taken to the
highest court of the United States by appeal from the State courts if there should be any
attempt to enforce any obnoxious law of a State”).  Stephens, it is worth noting, served as
Vice President of the Confederacy and is perhaps best known for delivering the “Corner
Stone Speech,” in which he described the Confederate government as founded “upon the
great truth that the negro is not equal to the white man; that slavery -subordination to the
superior race is his natural and normal condition.”  Alexander H. Stephens, The Corner
Stone Speech (Mar. 21, 1861), available at https://web.archive.org/web/20130822142313/
http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/cornerstone-speech/.
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the theory that Morrison would use to reject it. But what about the
Supreme Court?  There, interestingly, the story of the Civil Rights Act
took a quite different turn.
B. Arguments in the Court
The Civil Rights Cases consolidated five different cases featuring
the Civil Rights Act of 1875.  Four were prosecutions against individu-
als for denying access to inns or theaters.147  One was a suit by a hus-
band and wife against a railroad for denying the wife a seat in the
ladies’ car.148  The main issue in all of them, as the Court noted, was
the constitutionality of the Act.149
Some of the cases reached the Supreme Court in October Term
1879, and Attorney General Charles Devens submitted a brief for the
United States.150  But the cases were delayed for rebriefing, and Solici-
tor General S.F. Phillips submitted another brief for the United States
in October Term 1882.151
Neither of these briefs presented either element of the state neg-
lect theory.  The Devens brief is a surprisingly lackluster affair.  It
opens with a brief allusion to the Commerce Clause, noting that inns
are “essential instrumentalities of commerce . . . which it was the prov-
ince of the United States to regulate even prior to the recent amend-
ments to the Constitution.”152  The argument that follows is
unfocused even by the standards of nineteenth-century briefing and
consists largely of quotation and paraphrase of the congressional de-
bates.153  Its main theme is that businesses conducted pursuant to a
147 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 4 (1883).
148 Id. at 4–5.
149 Id. at 8–9.
150 Brief for the United States at 21, The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (Nos. 1,
2, 4) [hereinafter Devens Brief].
151 Brief for the United States at 25, The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (Nos. 1,
2, 3, 204) [hereinafter Phillips Brief].
152 Devens Brief, supra note 150, at 9.
153 In the course of one such passage, paraphrasing Senator Frelinghuysen’s remarks,
the brief offers an explanation as to why direct regulation of private parties is an appropri-
ate remedy: “We cannot proceed against or deal with the States to procure needed legisla-
tion; nor compel action by the grand juries of a State.  We must necessarily prosecute
directly those offenders who deny, on account of race or color, that equality which the
Constitution guarantees.” Id. at 11.  This point is part of the state neglect theory, but it
omits the crucial explanation of what constitutional violation (state failure to enforce its
laws equally) is being remedied. Cf. 2 CONG. REC. 3454 (Apr. 29, 1874) (remarks of Sen.
Frelinghuysen).
And now, Mr. President, what is the remedy? How is the United States, how
are we, to protect the privileges of citizens of the United States in the
States? We cannot deal with the States or with their officials to compel
proper legislation and its enforcement; we can only deal with the offenders
who violate the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States.
Id.
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license from the state are “quasi public in [their] nature” and there-
fore susceptible to regulation under Section 5.154  In modern terms,
the claim is that businesses operating under state license, or at least
common carriers with such licenses, are state actors.  The brief closes
with five solid pages of congressional remarks and an oddly anticli-
mactic final sentence: “It is thought unnecessary to try to add anything
to what was said in support of the law in question.”155
The Phillips brief offers a more doctrinally focused presentation
but essentially the same substance.  The defendants, it argues, “did
not act in a capacity exclusively private, but in one devoted to a public
use, and so affected with a public [State] interest.”156  “It is submitted,” the
brief continues, “that if State law appropriates inns to public use, then
innkeepers, being persons invested with the duty of distributing this
use, possess to a certain extent the character of public officers, i.e.,
officers or agents of the State.”157
Nor is a word about duty to protect or regulation of private par-
ties to be found in the opponents’ briefs.158  None of the individual
defendants participated at the Supreme Court level, and the railroad,
which did submit a brief, focused its argument on the contention that
the conductor had refused to seat the wife because he believed her to
be a prostitute.159  The state neglect theory was simply never
presented to the Supreme Court.
C. The Decision
Since the state neglect theory was not present in the briefs, it
should not be surprising that it did not feature in the Court’s deci-
sion, either.  The Court engaged, or at least rejected, the argument
that the government did offer, that innkeepers and similar common
154 Devens Brief, supra note 150, at 9.
155 Id. at 21.
156 Phillips Brief, supra note 151, at 19 (alteration in original).  Again, parts of the state
neglect theory may be found implicit in the brief.  In summarizing the state of the law, the
brief notes that “[t]he fourteenth amendment expresses prohibitions (and consequently
implies corresponding positive immunities), limiting state action only, including in such ac-
tion, however, action by all State agencies,—executive, legislative, and judicial,—of
whatsoever degree.” Id. at 15.  It also asserts that “the legislature, in dealing about institu-
tions, or action forbidden to States, can forbid any action by private persons which may reason-
ably be apprehended as tending to such institution or action.” Id. at 19. The brief does not,
however, identify a failure to enforce public accommodation laws as a constitutional viola-
tion warranting a remedy.
157 Id. at 19.
158 See, e.g., Brief for Memphis & Charleston Railroad Co. at 2–5, The Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (No. 28) (arguing only that the Act did not apply to the defen-
dant’s conduct).
159 See id. at 2.
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carriers should be deemed agents of the State.160  If they were not
state actors, then, as the Court noted, there was nothing in the text of
the Civil Rights Act that made any mention of state action.
An inspection of the law shows that it makes no reference whatever
to any supposed or apprehended violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment on the part of the States.  It is not predicated on any
such view.  It proceeds ex directo to declare that certain acts commit-
ted by individuals shall be deemed offences [sic], and shall be pros-
ecuted and punished by proceedings in the courts of the United
States.161
The problem with the Act, in short, was the one that Senator
Thurman had suggested during the debate.  “There is not one single
sentence in the whole bill which is leveled against any law made or
enforced by a State.”162  As far as the majority knew (or so it said),
state laws entitled all persons to equal access, and state officers en-
forced those laws.163  There was no violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment in response to which Congress could deploy its Section 5
enforcement power.164
Justice Harlan, in dissent, offered several different theories as to
why the Civil Rights Act fell within congressional enforcement power.
He argued that the precedent of Prigg v. Pennsylvania and the prewar
passage of the Fugitive Slave Acts, which regulated private parties,
showed that Congress could reach individuals when legislating to
160 The Court’s opinion clearly indicates that common carriers are not state actors, but
it does not explain why the government (and Justice Harlan’s dissent) are wrong. See The
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24–25 (1883).
161 Id. at 14.
162 2 CONG. REC. 4085 (May 20, 1874) (statement of Sen. Thurman).
163 See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 25 (“Innkeepers and public carriers, by the
laws of all the States, so far as we are aware, are bound, to the extent of their facilities, to
furnish proper accommodation to all unobjectionable persons who in good faith apply for
them.”).  This was less true than the majority supposed, as the congressional debates
showed. See supra text accompanying notes 135–36.
164 See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 14 (noting the law made “no reference
whatever to any . . . violation of the Fourteenth Amendment on the part of the States”).
United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 639 (1883), likewise turns on the failure of Congress to
identify any constitutional violation to which it was responding.
The language of the amendment does not leave this subject in doubt.
When the State has been guilty of no violation of its provisions; . . . when,
on the contrary, the laws of the State, as enacted by its legislative, and con-
strued by its judicial, and administered by its executive departments, recog-
nize and protect the rights of all persons, the amendment imposes no duty and
confers no power upon Congress. . . .
As, therefore, the section of the law under consideration is directed exclu-
sively against the action of private persons, without reference to the laws of the
State or their administration by her officers, we are clear in the opinion that it
is not warranted by any clause in the Fourteenth Amendment.
Harris, 106 U.S. at 639–40 (emphasis added).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\100-3\CRN302.txt unknown Seq: 30 18-MAR-15 8:28
632 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 100:603
protect constitutional rights.165  He characterized discrimination in
places of public accommodation as one of the badges and incidents of
slavery, which Congress could eradicate under the Thirteenth Amend-
ment.166  Turning to the Fourteenth Amendment, he pointed out that
the Citizenship Clause of Section 1 had no state action require-
ment.167  And he endorsed the government’s claim that common
carriers were state actors.168  He did not, however, make any mention
of the state neglect theory.169
The majority’s failure to mention the state neglect theory of
course does not amount to rejection of it, and indeed there are sev-
eral passages in the majority opinion that seem consistent with the
theory and certainly at least the duty to protect element.  Justice
Bradley faults the Act for applying “equally to cases arising in states
which have the justest laws respecting the personal rights of citizens,
and whose authorities are ever ready to enforce such laws, as to those
which arise in States that may have violated the prohibition of the
amendment”170—suggesting that a failure of enforcement might trig-
ger congressional authority.171  And state neglect features more prom-
165 See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 28–30 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
166 See id. at 35–40.
167 See id. at 46–47.
168 See id. at 58–59.
In every material sense applicable to the practical enforcement of the Four-
teenth Amendment, railroad corporations, keepers of inns, and managers
of places of public amusement are agents or instrumentalities of the State,
because they are charged with duties to the public, and are amenable, in
respect of their duties and functions, to governmental regulation.
Id. This argument proceeds by taking the public/private line the Court had drawn to dis-
tinguish private enterprises from those “affected with a public interest” and hence subject
to greater regulation, see Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 130 (1877), and using it to set the
boundaries of state action.
169 The closest he comes is a passage suggesting that Congress has the latitude to regu-
late private parties if it deems such a remedy necessary, i.e., endorsing what I have called
the direct regulation element.
Under given circumstances, that which the court characterizes as corrective
legislation might be deemed by Congress appropriate and entirely suffi-
cient. Under other circumstances primary direct legislation may be re-
quired.  But it is for Congress, not the judiciary, to say that legislation is
appropriate—that is—best adapted to the end to be attained.
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 51 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
170  Id. at 14 (majority opinion).
171 Other passages are equally suggestive.  Justice Bradley defines enforcement as the
power to enact “appropriate legislation for correcting the effects of such prohibited State
laws and State acts, and thus to render them effectually null, void, and innocuous,” id. at
11—a definition that would seem to include the provision of an alternate forum and cause
of action as a means to render innocuous a state’s failure to enforce its own laws in its own
courts.  And he distinguishes private from state action on the grounds that:
The wrongful act of an individual, unsupported by any such authority, is
simply a private wrong, or a crime of that individual; an invasion of the
rights of the injured party, it is true, whether they affect his person, his
property, or his reputation; but if not sanctioned in some way by the State,
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inently in other Reconstruction-era legal materials, including an
opinion by Justice Bradley on circuit in United States v. Cruikshank.
When the right of citizens of the United States to vote is denied or
abridged by a state on account of their race, color, or previous con-
dition of servitude, either by withholding the right itself or the reme-
dies which are given to other citizens to enforce it, then, undoubtedly,
congress has the power to pass laws to directly enforce the right and
punish individuals for its violation, because that would be the only ap-
propriate and efficient mode of enforcing the amendment.  Con-
gress cannot, with any propriety, or to any good purpose, pass laws
forbidding the state legislature to deny or abridge the right, nor
declaring void any state legislation adopted for that end.  The prohi-
bition is already in the constitutional amendment, and laws in viola-
tion of it are absolutely void by virtue of that prohibition.  So far as
relates to rendering null and void the obnoxious law, it is done al-
ready; but that does not help the person entitled to vote.  By the
supposition the state law gives him no remedy and no redress.  It is
clear, therefore, that the only practical way in which congress can enforce
the amendment is by itself giving a remedy and giving redress.172
United States v. Harris is the other case on which Morrison relied
for its rule of private party immunity to Section 5 legislation.173  I have
noted already that Harris enunciates no such rule; like the Civil Rights
Cases, it simply affirms the necessity of some constitutional violation as
a trigger for congressional enforcement power.174  Coincidentally, just
as Justice Bradley, the author of the Civil Rights Cases, gave a lengthy
statement of the state neglect theory on circuit, so too did Justice
Wood, the author of Harris.  In United States v. Hall,175 he wrote:
From these provisions it follows clearly, as it seems to us, that con-
gress has the power, by appropriate legislation, to protect the funda-
or not done under State authority, his rights remain in full force, and may
presumably be vindicated by resort to the laws of the State for redress.
Id. at 17.
Here, too, the implication seems to be that a state failure to vindicate the rights would
amount to sanctioning their invasion and constitute state action triggering the enforce-
ment power.
172 United States v. Cruikshank, 25 F. Cas. 707, 713 (C.C.D. La. 1874) (No. 14,896),
aff’d, 92 U.S. 542 (1875) (emphasis added).  It is worth noting that Justice Bradley applied
a different analysis to enforcement of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, on the
grounds that the Fifteenth created a new right while the Fourteenth merely guaranteed
preexisting rights. See PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RETHINKING THE JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF RE-
CONSTRUCTION 98–101 (2011).  That allowed him to conclude, as he did later in the opin-
ion, that Congress could act to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment voting right even
without a showing of state violation. See id. at 100.  The quoted portion of his analysis of
the Fifteenth Amendment, however, should apply equally to the Fourteenth, as it concerns
the proper form of enforcement legislation if states do violate the Amendment.
173 See United States v. Morrison, 528 U.S. 598, 621 (2000).
174 See supra note 164.
175 26 F. Cas. 79, 81–82 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871) (No. 15,282).  Wood was a circuit judge at
the time; he was elevated to the Supreme Court by President Hayes in 1880.
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mental rights of citizens of the United States against unfriendly or
insufficient state legislation, for the fourteenth amendment not
only prohibits the making or enforcing of laws which shall abridge
the privileges of the citizen, but prohibits the states from denying to
all persons within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Denying includes inaction as well as action, and denying the equal
protection of the laws includes the omission to protect, as well as
the omission to pass laws for protection.  The citizen of the United
States is entitled to the enforcement of the laws for the protection
of his fundamental rights, as well as the enactment of such laws.
Therefore, to guard against the invasion of the citizen’s fundamen-
tal rights, and to insure their adequate protection, as well against
state legislation as state inaction, or incompetency, the amendment
gives congress the power to enforce its provisions by appropriate
legislation.  And as it would be unseemly for congress to interfere
directly with state enactments, and as it cannot compel the activity
of state officials, the only appropriate legislation it can make is that
which will operate directly on offenders and offenses, and protect
the rights which the amendment secures.  The extent to which con-
gress shall exercise this power must depend on its discretion in view
of the circumstances of each case.  If the exercise of it in any case
should seem to interfere with the domestic affairs of a state, it must
be remembered that it is for the purpose of protecting federal
rights, and these must be protected even though it interfere with
state laws or the administration of state laws.176
In sum, the state neglect theory was not at issue in the Civil Rights
Cases.  It can be pieced together from the congressional debates, but it
was not a main theme.  There are scattered statements that seem con-
sistent with it in the government’s briefs, but it was never offered as a
coherent argument.  And neither the majority nor the dissent dis-
cussed it explicitly.  The idea that the Civil Rights Cases announced a
bright-line rule against regulating private parties under the Section 5
power is entirely mistaken: to the extent that the Civil Rights Cases
shed any light on state neglect, they support it.  So too, much more
strongly, do earlier circuit opinions by the authors of the Civil Rights
Cases and Harris.  State neglect was a live theory of congressional
power—though perhaps not the most prominent one—in the legal
community during, and even shortly after, Reconstruction.177  The
next section explores its subsequent fate.178
176 Id. at 81–82; see also United States v. Given, 25 F. Cas. 1324, 1328 (C.C.D. Del. 1873)
(No. 15,210) (Strong, J., on circuit) (“It is . . . an exploded heresy that the national govern-
ment cannot reach all individuals in the states.”).
177 See Brandwein, supra note 116, at 287–302 (discussing post-Reconstruction congres- R
sional debates and Supreme Court cases mentioning the state neglect theory).
178 Pamela Brandwein, in a series of articles and a 2011 book, explores the state neg-
lect concept during Reconstruction and thereafter. See BRANDWEIN, supra note 172; Pamela R
Brandwein, A Judicial Abandonment of Blacks? Rethinking the “State Action” Cases of the Waite
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\100-3\CRN302.txt unknown Seq: 33 18-MAR-15 8:28
2015] BAIT AND SWITCH 635
D. The Fate of State Neglect
The state neglect theory, I have said, has two elements.  First is
the duty to protect: the idea that the Equal Protection Clause obliges
states to enforce their laws for the benefit of all persons equally.  The
second element is direct regulation: the thesis that if a state violates its
duty to protect, direct regulation of private parties may be an appro-
priate enforcement measure.
These two elements are connected in the following way.  Direct
regulation might seem prima facie implausible.  If private parties can-
not violate the Equal Protection Clause, how can Congress claim to
“enforce” it by regulating them?  But as we have seen, it is the only
remotely plausible means of remedying a state’s violation of its duty to
protect.  If direct regulation is not allowed, there can be no enforce-
ment at all.  If the duty to protect is seen as central to the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, a total lack of enforcement is intolerable, and direct
regulation, as the only option, must be appropriate.  If, on the other
hand, the duty to protect is seen as peripheral to equal protection, a
complete inability to enforce might be accepted, and the rejection of
direct regulation gains plausibility.  Thus, as the duty to protect comes
to be seen as less central to the Equal Protection Clause, direct regula-
tion likewise loses appeal.
This migration from center to periphery is exactly what hap-
pened to the duty to protect.179  It was never rejected—indeed, when-
ever it addressed the question, the Supreme Court affirmed that a
selective failure of enforcement would violate the Equal Protection
Clause.180  But the clause itself progressively came to be seen as con-
cerned more with classification than with failure to protect.  As
Christopher Green observes, the pattern can be seen clearly in a series
of opinions by Justice Field: in each, he begins with a nod toward the
duty to protect but then shifts focus to an anticlassification perspec-
tive.181  And nowadays, of course, our high-profile equal protection
cases—think Brown, Loving, Grutter, Parents Involved, and so on—are all
Court, 41 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 343, 350–65 (2007) [hereinafter Brandwein, Abandonment];
Brandwein, supra note 116; Brandwein, supra note 10.  She does an excellent job of finding R
it within Reconstruction-era judicial opinions and legal thought.  She does not, however,
seem to appreciate the extent to which it persisted in the 1960s and the central role it
played in the Morrison litigation. See infra note 204 and accompanying text. R
179 See generally Green, Application, supra note 118, at 278–91 (describing the Court’s
shift from a “duty-to-protect” to anticlassification jurisprudential scheme).
180 See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197 n.3
(1989).
181 See Green, Application, supra note 118, at 285–88 (describing Field’s opinions in
Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885); R.R. Tax Cases, 13 F. 722, 733 (C.C. Cal. 1882),
error dismissed sub nom. San Mateo Cnty. v. S. Pac. Ry. Co., 116 U.S. 138 (1885); Ho Ah Kow
v. Nunan, 12 F. Cas. 252, 256 (C.C. Cal. 1879) (No. 6,546); In re Ah Fong, 1 F. Cas. 213,
218 (C.C. Cal. 1874) (No. 102)).
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about the permissibility of different kinds of classifications.182
Correlatively, as I have said, direct regulation of private parties came
to seem a less plausible method of enforcement under Section 5.
Why did this happen?  There are several different explanations,
each of which paints the Court in a different light.183  None of them is
likely the sole and exclusive truth; each probably played a role.  First,
the view that is least flattering to the Court:  anticlassification might
have been the easy way out.184  Implementing the duty to protect is
demanding for courts and intrusive against states.  It requires a court
to consider equality issues from a substantive and practical perspec-
tive, to consider private action and the state’s response, and, if it is to
grant a remedy, to order officials to act. Striking down classifications,
by contrast, requires courts to consider equality in only a formal and
legal sense, to look only at state laws or official action, and only to
forbid certain acts as a remedy.  It is entirely consistent with a regime
in which an entrenched caste system persists through private action
and state acquiescence.  Substituting anticlassification for the duty to
protect allowed the Court to claim victory in cases like Strauder185
while simultaneously participating in the general retreat from
Reconstruction.186
Second, more charitably, it could be that the Court was trying to
preserve what seemed most valuable.  The importance of establishing
an anticlassification rule—or more precisely, a rule against invidious
classifications187—might have driven the Court to stress that aspect of
equal protection at the expense of the duty to protect.  (On this
theory, blame for the eclipse of the duty to protect lies with the
182 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,
709–11 (2007) (addressing classification based on race); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,
311 (2003) (same); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967) (same); Brown v. Bd. of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483, 493 (1953) (same).
183 See generally BRANDWEIN, supra note 172, at 168–70 (offering different possible ex-
planations for the decision in the Civil Rights Cases).
184 See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in
Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1475 (2004) (describing the
Court’s varied use of anticlassification since Brown to mask other constitutional concerns).
185 See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 312 (1879).
186 See, e.g., The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 14 (1883) (striking down Civil Rights
Act of 1875 despite widespread racial discrimination); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629,
639 (1883) (same for Civil Rights Act of 1871).
187 From its earliest cases, and consistently thereafter, the Court announced that the
Equal Protection Clause did not forbid all classifications, nor all classifications based on
certain characteristics such as race, but rather all invidious classifications. See, e.g.,
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 732 (1963) (“Statutes create many classifications which
do not deny equal protection; it is only ‘invidious discrimination’ which offends the Consti-
tution.”); Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 30–32 (1885) (upholding legislation after find-
ing “no invidious discrimination”).  A more elaborate description of the forbidden
classifications can be found in Strauder, 100 U.S. at 306, 308 (focusing on “dislike,” “jeal-
ousy,” and attempts to attach a “brand” of “inferiority”).
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Slaughter-House Cases, which read the anticlassification rule out of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause, forcing Equal Protection to shoulder
the load.188)
Last, regardless of how committed the Court was to racial equal-
ity, expanding federal commerce power made direct regulation under
Section 5 less necessary.189  After the New Deal, the commerce power
seemed essentially boundless, and the theory of state neglect was not
needed to enable the federal government to regulate private discrimi-
nation in places of public accommodation.
That may seem obvious in retrospect, and indeed, when the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 was challenged, the government relied solely on
the Commerce Clause for justification.190  But that strategic choice
was not a foregone conclusion, and in the years before the Act was
passed, lawyers and judges grappled with the state action doctrine and
the role of state neglect.191
In the early 1960s, the Supreme Court was confronted with a
series of sit-in cases.192  African Americans protesting segregation went
to privately owned segregated restaurants or lunch counters, request-
ing service and refusing to leave.  Arrested under state trespass stat-
utes, they challenged their convictions on equal protection
grounds.193
These equal protection theories faced a state action hurdle.  The
state certainly acts when it makes or enforces a trespass law, but it acts
in a race-neutral way: it allows property owners to exclude others for
188 See Green, Application, supra note 118, at 222; Roosevelt, supra note 48, at 71–73. R
Indeed, it is notable that Justice Field, whose early opinions show the shift from the duty to
protect to anticlassification, is the Slaughter-House dissenter who argued for an anticlassifica-
tion reading of Privileges or Immunities. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 118
(1873) (Field, J., dissenting).  His evident belief in the importance of an anticlassification
norm may explain his efforts to inject it into the Equal Protection Clause, even at the
expense of the duty to protect.
189 See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964).
190 See Brief for the United States at 15, Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379
U.S. 241 (1964), 1964 WL 95342 (noting that “the government has proceeded throughout
this litigation upon the theory that the constitutionality of Title II . . . may be sustained
under the commerce clause without reference to the additional power conferred by Sec-
tion 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment”).
191 In arguing that state neglect remained a viable theory in the minds of judges and
scholars throughout the twentieth century, I differ from Brandwein, who describes it as a
lost theory in need of recovery. See BRANDWEIN, supra note 172, at 240–44.  The difference R
matters for the assessment of Morrison.  If Brandwein is right, the Morrison Court can hardly
be faulted for not dredging up a concept that everyone else had forgotten, though recover-
ing it might, in Brandwein’s words, “provide a rejoinder” to Morrison. Id. at 243.  If, on the
other hand, the concept was well known and explicitly presented to the Morrison Court (as
I will show it was), matters appear somewhat different.
192 See Brad Ervin, Note, Result or Reason: The Supreme Court and the Sit-In Cases, 93 VA. L.
REV. 181, 182–85 (2007).
193 For discussion of the sit-in cases, see generally id.; Michael Klarman, An Interpretive
History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 272–82 (1991).
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any reason, and it enforces the right to exclude at the request of all
comers.  Consequently, finding a constitutional violation required
some modification to the standard state action analysis.194
Every one of the Justices to hear the sit-in cases appears to have
wanted to reverse the demonstrators’ convictions, but not every Justice
was willing to extend the state action theory to cover the case in which
a private party invokes a neutral law for a race-based reason.195  Justice
Douglas, writing at first only for himself but later gaining additional
votes, wanted to follow Justice Harlan’s dissent in the Civil Rights Cases
to rule that the proprietors of places of public accommodation could
be deemed state actors.196
State neglect offered a more moderate path to a similar result. In
Bell v. Maryland,197 Justice Goldberg wrote a concurring opinion offer-
ing this theory.198 He presented it as consistent with the Civil Rights
Cases, noting that Bradley had relied on the fact that all states “so far
as we are aware” had and enforced common carrier laws.199  “This as-
sumption,” he continued, “whatever its validity at the time of the 1883
decision, has proved to be unfounded.”200  In consequence, he be-
lieved, states were violating the Equal Protection Clause—in his view
and also in Bradley’s.
A State applying its statutory or common law to deny rather than
protect the right of access to public accommodations has clearly
made the assumption of the opinion in the Civil Rights Cases inappli-
cable and has, as the author of that opinion would himself have
recognized, denied the constitutionally intended equal
protection.201
Goldberg’s opinion was joined by Chief Justice Warren, giving state
neglect two votes at the Supreme Court level.202  That is not a major-
ity, to be sure, but it certainly indicates that the theory was alive and
taken seriously at the highest level of the judiciary.
Scholars were likewise engaged.  One month after Bell was de-
cided, the Yale Law Journal published an article by Laurent Frantz enti-
tled “Congressional Power to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment
194 See Ervin, supra note 192, at 186 (noting the Justices in the sit-in cases considered
“leaning toward a ‘broad’ interpretation of state action”).
195 See id.
196 See Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 177, 181–83 (1961) (Douglas, J, concurring).
197 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
198 Id. at 286–318 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
199 Id. at 306–07.
200 Id. at 307.
201 Id. at 308–09.
202 See id. at 286.  Justice Douglas did not join the state neglect part of Goldberg’s
concurrence; he wanted to go farther and hold that no state action was needed. See Garner,
368 U.S. at 181–83.  Justice Brennan wrote the majority opinion in Bell, which avoided the
constitutional question. See Bell, 378 U.S. at 227.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\100-3\CRN302.txt unknown Seq: 37 18-MAR-15 8:28
2015] BAIT AND SWITCH 639
Against Private Acts.”203  Frantz offered a comprehensive statement of
the state neglect theory, arguing, as Goldberg had, that this was con-
sistent with Justice Bradley’s views in the Civil Rights Cases.204  Other
academic publications likewise articulated the concept of state neglect
and attributed it to Bradley.205
However, as noted, the federal government did not press this ar-
gument before the Supreme Court.  It argued that the provisions of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 outlawing racial discrimination in places
of public accommodation could be sustained under the commerce
power.206  The Supreme Court accepted that claim, and its willingness
to uphold antidiscrimination legislation on Commerce Clause
grounds made the Section 5 justification seem unnecessary.207
For decades after the Civil Rights–era litigation, the Supreme
Court did not strike down a single law as exceeding Congress’s power
203 73 YALE L.J. 1353 (1964).
204 See id. at 1377–81.  Brandwein, consistent with her theory that state neglect was
forgotten in the twentieth century, describes Frantz’s exposition of state neglect as “skele-
tal” and the article itself as “underappreciated.” See Brandwein, Abandonment, supra note
178, at 346 n.5.  Both these judgments are subjective, but the conclusions seem odd.
Frantz sets out the theory in five-point form in his opening section—as elaborate a presen-
tation as I have ever seen—and then spends thirty-four journal pages supporting the vari-
ous elements with close analysis of the Reconstruction cases. See Frantz, supra note 203, at
1359–84.  This analysis includes an extended quotation from Justice Bradley’s circuit opin-
ion in Cruikshank. See id. at 1367–68.  Oddly, eleven pages after her dismissal of Frantz,
Brandwein quotes the same passage and comments, “I have never seen this passage quoted
in the Reconstruction legal literature . . . .”  Brandwein, Abandonment, supra note 178, at
357.  As for the appreciation, Frantz was cited in two major Supreme Court Section 5 cases:
United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 783 n.7 (1966) (Brennan, J., concurring), and Katzen-
bach v. McClung, 384 U.S. 641, 648 n.7 (1966), as well as twelve other federal court deci-
sions, one of which quoted him extensively and concluded, “On the basis of the current,
and I believe more accurate, construction of the Fourteenth Amendment, I hold that Con-
gress had the power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to reach purely private acts
of racial discrimination . . . .”  Pennsylvania v. Local Union No. 542, 347 F. Supp. 268,
293–94 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (Higginbotham, J.).  And, as the text describes, Frantz’s article
formed the basis for the government’s Section 5 argument in Morrison. See infra text ac-
companying notes 213–14. R
205 See, e.g., John Silard, A Constitutional Forecast: Demise of the “State Action” Limit on the
Equal Protection Guarantee, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 855, 857 (1966) (“Careful reading of the 1883
decision [in the Civil Rights Cases], especially its repeated dictum references to the differ-
ent issues which would arise should states fail to protect the Negro, discloses that its narrow
holding was a justifiable application of the equal protection norm.” (citation omitted)).
206 See Brief for the United States at 15, Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379
U.S. 241 (1964), 1964 WL 95342.
207 Justice Douglas did write separately in Heart of Atlanta to urge a Section 5 rationale.
See Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 280 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“I would prefer to rest
on the assertion of legislative power contained in § 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment . . . .”).  As in the sit-in cases, he wanted to adopt Justice Harlan’s dissent in the Civil
Rights Cases and extend the category of state actors to include places of public accommoda-
tion. Id.
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under the Commerce Clause.208  Courts, including the Supreme
Court, did accept the duty to protect reading of equal protection.209
But with the federal commerce power apparently plenary, there was
no need to think about the implications of this reading for Section 5.
Then came Lopez.  In 1995, for the first time in sixty years, the
Court found that a law had gone beyond the limits of the commerce
power.210  Intrastate noncommercial activity, it suggested, could not
be regulated under the Commerce Clause, at least not without a
strong showing of an effect on interstate commerce.211  The Violence
Against Women Act’s civil rights remedy now clearly looked vulnera-
ble, for it was regulating just such activity.  Congress had, of course,
amassed a substantial record to show the effects of gender-motivated
violence on interstate commerce, and the government devoted much
of its briefing to the Commerce Clause argument.212  But that argu-
ment was far from a clear winner and so the Section 5 rationale was
again in play.
Before both the Fourth Circuit and the Supreme Court, the
United States and Christy Brzonkala offered the state neglect theory.
At the court of appeals level, the government’s brief relied on Frantz
so heavily that the majority opinion rebuked them, in a scathing foot-
note, for “cit[ing] this journal article twice as often as it cites the Su-
preme Court’s decision in the Civil Rights Cases.”213  Apparently
chastened, they did not cite Frantz in their Supreme Court brief, but
the theory was the same.  The Civil Rights Cases, the government
claimed, dealt with a situation where no constitutional violation had
been identified—not the quite different case of congressional re-
208 See, e.g., David A. Strauss, The Modernizing Mission of Judicial Review, 76 U. CHI. L.
REV. 859, 888 (2009) (noting that Lopez marked “the first time in sixty years” that the Court
had struck down a statute as exceeding the commerce power).
209 See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197 n.3
(1989) (“The State may not, of course, selectively deny its protective services to certain
disfavored minorities without violating the Equal Protection Clause.”); Bowers v. DeVito,
686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982) (“Discrimination in providing protection against private
violence could of course violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.”).  Academics also offered this theory in the years leading up to Morrison, frequently
attributing it to Bradley and the Civil Rights Cases. See, e.g., Michael G. Collins, Justice Brad-
ley’s Civil Rights Odyssey Revisited, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1979, 1997 n.98 (1996) (listing such
articles).
210 See Strauss, supra note 208, at 888.
211 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995) (noting that intrastate activity
may be commercial activity within Congress’s Commerce Clause power, but the instant
regulation reached noncommercial activity).
212 See Brief for the United States at 20–32, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598
(2000) (Nos. 99–5 and 99–29); see also id. at 5–11 (discussing Congress’s findings).
213 Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst., 169 F.3d 820, 880 n.30 (4th Cir. 1999).  The
court took special exception, apparently, to Frantz’s description of his reading of the Civil
Rights Cases as “subtle” and “complex,” since it singled out that passage for mockery. See id.
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sponse to an identified violation.214  When a violation did exist, regu-
lation of private parties might be an appropriate remedy.215
Morrison, of course, rejected this theory. The Court’s hands were
tied by precedent, Rehnquist suggested. Morrison was “controlled by”
the Civil Rights Cases and their bright-line rule against regulating pri-
vate parties.216
The preceding sections have shown that this reading of the Civil
Rights Cases is incorrect.  They have shown something more, too—they
have shown that its incorrectness was pointed out repeatedly through
the twentieth century and quite explicitly to the Morrison Court.  State
neglect was not a lost theory in need of recovery; it was a perfectly vital
theory that was killed by Morrison.217  If we are looking for the wrong
turn in our Section 5 jurisprudence, what we need to reappraise is not
so much the Civil Rights Cases or their twentieth-century reception as
Morrison.  The following Part undertakes that reappraisal.  It compares
the Court’s performance in the Civil Rights Cases to its performance in
Morrison, making the case that the latter is significantly worse.
IV
ASSESSING THE CIVIL RIGHTS CASES AND MORRISON
A. The Civil Rights Cases
There is a general view that the Civil Rights Cases were not the
Court’s finest hour.  Their constitutional constructions “reflected the
prejudices of their time,” writes Jack Balkin, and it is difficult to look
back on parts of Justice Bradley’s opinion without “the same sense of
shock and embarrassment that we associate with the language of Plessy
v. Ferguson.”218
It is certainly true that parts of the decision are offensive, and that
as a whole, it did not advance racial equality.219  And it is also true that
214 See Brief for the United States at 46–48, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598
(2000) (Nos. 99–5 and 99–29), 1999 WL 1037259; Reply Brief for the United States at
14–16, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (Nos. 99–5 and 99–29), 1999 WL
1276924.
215 See Reply Brief for the United States at 9–10, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598 (2000) (Nos. 99–5 and 99–29) (noting that, in response to “a documented state failure
to address a national problem,” the Act “enables victims of gender-motivated violence to
seek damages and other relief against their assailants”).
216 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 602.
217 At least, the direct regulation element was killed.  Even Morrison accepts the duty to
protect element. See id. at 619–20.
218 Balkin, supra note 92, at 1834; see also, e.g., Ugarte, supra note 93, at 484 (“A close R
examination of the decision in the Civil Rights Cases, together with the social and political
history surrounding it, shows that the case should be of no greater moral authority than
Dred Scott or Plessy.” (citations omitted)).
219 The most cringe-inducing lines are Bradley’s statement that blacks at some point
must “cease[ ] to be the special favorite of the laws.”  The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25
(1883).  But they should not surprise us; this is what opponents of equality movements
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the decision fit well with the Compromise of 1877.220  Federal troops
withdrew from the southern states, and the federal judiciary likewise
reduced its oversight.  The Court removed the constraints of federal
antidiscrimination law from private actors.221
On the other hand, if we limit our focus to what the Court actu-
ally said about the Constitution and the enforcement power, the Civil
Rights Cases do not look especially bad.  The decision relies on three
propositions: that proprietors of places of public accommodation are
private actors; that private action, by itself, cannot violate the Four-
teenth Amendment; and that Congress cannot use its enforcement
power in the absence of an actual or threatened constitutional viola-
tion.222  Each of these is solidly within the mainstream of modern con-
stitutional thought.
The arguments on which the Court relied are not particularly sur-
prising or outré.  There are, of course, arguments in favor of the Civil
Rights Act that it did not consider.  State neglect is one of these, but it
would have been surprising for Justice Bradley to consider a theory
that neither the government nor Justice Harlan’s dissent presented.
Harlan did offer other arguments, rooted, for instance, in Prigg v.
Pennsylvania and the Citizenship Clause, which Justice Bradley did not
engage.223  But by failing to reject them, he allowed them to survive to
fight another day.  By 1883, Reconstruction—and indeed, the Civil
Rights Act itself—were beyond the ability of the Court to save.224  The
most charitable reading of the Civil Rights Cases would suggest that the
Court bowed to political realities in striking down the Act while doing
as little damage as it could to constitutional doctrine.225  That may be
excessively generous, but it is fairly clear that the Court did not go out
of its way to cut back on the federal enforcement power.  It did not
always say, and they always look outrageous in retrospect if they lose.  Opponents of antidis-
crimination protection for gays and lesbians, for example, consistently argue that they are
opposing “special rights.” See generally Samuel A. Marcosson, The “Special Rights” Canard in
the Debate over Lesbian and Gay Civil Rights, 9 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 137
(1995) (exploring the concept of “special rights”).
220 See, e.g., C. VANN WOODWARD, ORIGINS OF THE NEW SOUTH 1877–1913, at 216 (1971)
(describing the Civil Rights Cases as the “juristic fulfillment of the Compromise of 1877”).
Brandwein offers a more sympathetic reading. See BRANDWEIN, supra note 172, at 169–70.
221 See Ugarte, supra note 93, at 483–84.
222 See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 13–14, 24.
223 See, e.g., id. at 50 (using Prigg to argue Congress may “enforce and protect any right
derived from or created by the national Constitution”).
224 See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863–1877,
at 556 (1988) (noting that the Civil Rights Act was viewed as a “dead letter” even before the
Civil Rights Cases).
225 Brandwein suggests this view at times. See BRANDWEIN, supra note 172, at 169 (argu-
ing that Bradley “kept the concept [of state neglect] available . . . without putting the
Court out in front of the political branches and thus without risking the Court’s
influence”).
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brazenly misrepresent prior cases. And it did not get out ahead of the
political branches in pushing an anti-antidiscrimination agenda.
The Morrison Court, by contrast, did all of those things.
B. Morrison
Morrison has not been the subject of such widespread denuncia-
tion as the Civil Rights Cases.  But let us try to consider Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s majority opinion comprehensively.  First, the opinion is
clearly driven by an intent to push back against Section 5 enforcement
authority.  Having announced the bright-line rule against using Sec-
tion 5 to regulate private parties, Morrison could have stopped.  In-
stead—unlike Justice Bradley’s opinion—it went on to suggest other
limits on the enforcement power.226  The civil rights remedy was sus-
pect, it noted, because “it applies uniformly throughout the
Nation.”227
Second, Morrison’s presentation of the Civil Rights Cases is nothing
short of bizarre.  It is one thing to read Bradley’s opinion carelessly
and to assume that the principle that the Fourteenth Amendment
binds only state actors implies that the enforcement power is likewise
limited.  Some people seem to have done that—at least, it is relatively
common to describe this reading as “conventional.”228  It is another to
persist in that reading when the state neglect theory has been
presented, as it was in the Morrison litigation.
Still, one might imaginably misread some of Bradley’s language
and fasten on that as decisively rejecting the state neglect theory.  But
Morrison did not do even this.  Evidently accepting that the language
of the opinion did not foreclose state neglect, it turned to the legisla-
tive history of the Act.  The 39th Congress thought in terms of state
neglect, Morrison argued, and so the Court must have rejected it229—
never mind that the government did not make the argument; never
226 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 625–27 (2000).
227 Id. at 626.  The principle that uniform laws are suspect could form the basis for
another bait and switch, given that the Roberts Court has recently discovered a “fundamen-
tal principle of equal sovereignty” that renders suspect nonuniform enforcement legisla-
tion. See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2622 (2013) (quoting Northwest Austin
Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009)).
228 It is actually surprisingly difficult to find pre-Morrison statements of this reading.
Pamela Brandwein and Michael Collins both describe it as conventional. See BRANDWEIN,
supra note 172, at 161 (describing the “conventional view” of the Civil Rights Cases, without
citing examples); Collins, supra note 209, at 1997 & n.98 (describing the “conventional
wisdom” surrounding the Civil Rights Cases while noting counterexamples).  Both of them,
however, also believe it is mistaken and, perhaps out of charity, neither identifies a specific
example of the mistake. See BRANDWEIN, supra note 172, at 161 (noting there is an “obsta-
cle” to the conventional view); Collins, supra note 209, at 2000–01 (arguing Justice Bradley
continued to “endorse broad constructions of federal power, even when state ‘laws’ were
not the sticking point” (citations omitted)).
229 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 624–25.
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mind that Bradley did not mention it; never mind that Bradley wrote
repeatedly of a complete absence of state action in any form.
This is a very curious way of reading precedent. Morrison takes an
issue that was not before the Court, about which no party or Justice
said anything, and claims that the Court has (somehow) decided it
because of scattered statements in the legislative history.  The resort to
legislative history suggests quite strongly that the Morrison majority did
not believe the opinion itself resolved the issue.  Is such a reach legiti-
mate—can a later Court fairly read the Civil Rights Cases to reject a
theory neither argued in the briefs nor mentioned in the opinion?
Interestingly, Morrison itself answers this question.  Just before its
unusual analysis of the Civil Rights Cases, Morrison considers United
States v. Guest,230 which the government suggested had accepted the
idea that the enforcement power could reach private parties.231  In
Guest, the Court upheld the prosecution of private individuals accused
of conspiring to deprive African Americans of various Fourteenth
Amendment rights.232  The state action requirement, the majority
held, was satisfied by the fact that the conspiracy was intended to work
in part by causing state police to arrest African Americans based on
false reports of criminal acts.233
That being so, the Guest majority wrote, the case “require[d] no
determination of the threshold level that state action must attain in
order to create rights under the Equal Protection Clause.”234  Two
separate three-Justice concurrences went further, however. Justice
Clark, joined by Justices Black and Fortas, wrote without further expla-
nation that “there now can be no doubt that the specific language of
§ 5 empowers the Congress to enact laws punishing all conspiracies—
with or without state action—that interfere with Fourteenth Amend-
ment rights.”235  Justice Brennan, joined by Chief Justice Warren and
Justice Douglas, offered more explanation but the same conclusion:
Congress could punish conspiracies to interfere with constitutional
rights “without regard to whether state officers participated in the al-
leged conspiracy.”236
Guest thus gives us six votes (what Brennan called “[a] majority of
the members of the Court”)237 for the proposition that Congress can
use Section 5 to regulate individuals in the absence of state action.
230 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
231 Brief for the United States at 47 n.28, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598
(2000) (Nos. 99-5 and 99-29) (citing Guest, 383 U.S. at 762 (Clark, J., concurring)).
232 See Guest, 383 U.S. at 759–60 & n.17.
233 See id. at 756–57.
234 Id. at 756.
235 Id. at 762 (Clark, J., concurring).
236 Id. at 777 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
237 Id. at 782.
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That proposition, if accepted, would overrule the Civil Rights Cases.238
What kind of precedential weight should those six votes receive?
None, said Morrison. Justice Harlan, in a separate opinion in
Guest, declared it at “the very least, extraordinary,” that the three Jus-
tices in the Clark block would “cursorily pronounc[e] themselves on
. . . far-reaching constitutional questions deliberately not reached.”239
Morrison endorsed the Harlan opinion (which got one vote).  It
quoted this passage and then referred contemptuously to Justices who
“saw fit to opine on matters not before the Court.”240  What is more,
Morrison pointed out, three of the Justices who stated that they be-
lieved Section 5 could reach private parties gave no explanation for
that view.241  “[I]t would take more,” Morrison concluded, “than the
naked dicta contained in Justice Clark’s opinion, when added to Jus-
tice Brennan’s opinion, to cast any doubt upon the enduring vitality
of the Civil Rights Cases and Harris.”242  A later Court cannot add up
votes from concurrences to produce a majority; it should discount un-
reasoned dicta.
But of course these scruples should apply just as strongly to Morri-
son’s use of the Civil Rights Cases.  A later Court should not, presuma-
bly, comb legislative history to find theories purportedly rejected by
an opinion that never mentions them and then take that as a bedrock
precedent.  To quote Morrison again, “[t]his is simply not the way that
reasoned constitutional adjudication proceeds.”243
Morrison’s reading of the Civil Rights Cases is peculiar then—it is
improper according to criteria it announces immediately beforehand.
Its characterization of the decision as carrying particular weight be-
238 Of course, as this Article has shown, overruling the Civil Rights Cases was not neces-
sary to uphold VAWA’s civil rights remedy. Guest also gives us a unanimous Court for the
proposition that private parties are not immune from Section 5 legislation if there is an
allegation of state action as well as private action. See id. at 757 (majority opinion); id. at
761–62 (Clark, J. concurring) (joined by Justices Black and Fortas); id. at 762–63 (Harlan,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 781–82 (Brennan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Douglas).  Taking Morrison
to establish such an immunity, then, is almost certainly wrong, although Morrison encour-
ages that reading. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 626 (2000) (faulting the
civil rights remedy for being “directed not at any State or state actor, but at individuals who
have committed criminal acts motivated by gender bias”).  The statute upheld in Guest was
likewise directed at individuals. See Guest, 383 U.S. at 747.  Perhaps the best reconciliation
of Guest and Morrison is to suppose that an allegation of state action is now a required
jurisdictional hook for Section 5 regulation of private parties, in the same way that an
effect on interstate commerce is a jurisdictional hook for regulation of intrastate noncom-
mercial activity under the Commerce Clause.
239 Guest, 383 U.S. at 762 n.1 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
240 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 623.
241 Id. at 624 (noting “the three Justices joining Justice Clark’s opinion . . . gave no
explanation whatever for their similar view”).
242 Id.
243 Id.
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cause of its historical vantage point is odd as well.  By 1883, Redemp-
tion had superseded Reconstruction.244  The Supreme Court at that
point was ratifying the Compromise of 1877, or at best engaging in
damage control.245  To get a sense of what judges thought closer in
time to the Fourteenth Amendment, one might look instead to the
circuit opinions of Bradley and Woods, both of which explicitly en-
dorse state neglect as a justification for regulating private parties.246
Last, there was no pressure on the Court to go along in the na-
tional abandonment of a politically weak group.  The Violence
Against Women Act was not passed by a lame-duck Congress, as the
Civil Rights Act of 1875 was.247  Nor was it forced upon resistant states.
The National Association of Attorneys General supported VAWA
unanimously; Attorneys General from thirty-eight states urged Con-
gress specifically to enact the civil rights remedy; and when VAWA was
challenged in Court, states came to its defense.248  Thirty-six states and
Puerto Rico filed briefs in support of the United States and Christy
Brzonkala; only one state (Alabama) took the other side.249  In strik-
ing down the Civil Rights Remedy, the Court was not acquiescing to a
political reality it could not change; it was asserting itself against the
political branches, pushing what Jed Rubenfeld has called the anti-
antidiscrimination agenda.250
Thinking in terms of anti-antidiscrimination helps to make sense
of Morrison.  The New Federalism, I have suggested, can be seen as a
delayed pushback against the expansion of federal power that accom-
panied the Civil Rights Movement,251 so it is not surprising that anti-
discrimination laws provide part of the setting of that pushback.  Nor
is it surprising to find Redemption-era cases cited approvingly.  Part of
the New Federalism is an attempt to minimize Reconstruction, which
244 See Ugarte, supra note 93, at 483 (“By 1883, the Supreme Court had taken a series
of actions effectively ending Reconstruction.”).
245 See Frantz, supra note 203, at 1361–62 (“In 1876 the structure of Reconstruction was
already crumbling and its impending defeat was evident.  In 1883 its defeat was a fact
which the North had accepted and acquiesced in for six years.”); Amar, supra note 92, at
107 (noting “the irony when Rehnquist describes post-Redemption cases seeking to undo
Reconstruction as rendered ‘[s]hortly after the Fourteenth Amendment’”).
246 See supra text accompanying notes 172–76.
247 See Nourse, supra note 96, at 27 (noting the “substantial support” behind VAWA in
May 1993); Strauss, supra note 208, at 891 (noting the Civil Rights Act was passed by a lame-
duck Congress).
248 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 653–54 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).
249 Id. at 654.
250 See Jed Rubenfeld, The Anti-Antidiscrimination Agenda, 111 YALE L. J. 1141, 1142–43
(2002).
251 See supra text accompanying note 43.
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can be done either by elevating the founding, as classic originalism
does,252 or by elevating Redemption.253
There is nothing wrong, of course, with an attempt to foreground
some historical periods and background others.  Our Constitution
must be understood in light of all its history, and differences in em-
phasis are inevitable.254  Still, the interaction between Morrison and
the Civil Rights Cases is unfortunate.
In the Civil Rights Cases, recall, Justice Bradley faulted Congress
for failing to identify any state action that could violate the Constitu-
tion.255  In the absence of a constitutional violation, enforcement leg-
islation was impermissible.  The flip side of this principle was an
implicit offer: if Congress produced evidence of a violation, it could
respond with appropriate enforcement measures.
Of course, Congress had at least some such evidence in 1875; it
had evidence that state laws could not be enforced for the benefit of
African Americans.256  Bradley said nothing about this.  He might sim-
ply have been unaware, since neither the government nor the dissent
raised the point, or he might have refrained from mentioning it in
order to preserve the theory of state neglect for the future.257  But
whatever the case, when the government accepted the implicit offer,
Morrison converted Bradley’s silence into something more sinister.
252 See Kermit Roosevelt III, Reconstruction and Resistance, 91 TEX. L. REV. 121, 141–42
(2012) (describing classic originalism as “the legal theory of the Second Redemption”).
This theme is present in Morrison as well.  The enforcement power must be limited, Rehn-
quist wrote, lest the Fourteenth Amendment “obliterat[e] the Framers’ carefully crafted
balance of power between the States and the National Government.” Morrison, 529 U.S. at
620.  This echoes one of the most absurd lines of the Slaughter-House Cases, where Miller
counsels against reading the Fourteenth Amendment to “radically change[ ] the whole
theory of the relations of the State and Federal governments to each other and of both
these governments to the people.”  The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 78 (1872).  In
each case, appealing to Framing understandings is a poor way to interpret Reconstruction
Amendments.  The Framers did have a particular balance of power in mind—they hoped,
for instance, that state militias might fight off a tyrannical federal government.  The Recon-
struction Congress had quite a different view of that prospect, and the Reconstruction
Amendments are designed precisely to alter the Framing balance, to expand federal au-
thority and restrain the states.
253 See Akhil Reed Amar, Plessy v. Ferguson and the Anti-Canon, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 75, 83
(2011) (noting the “revival of this Plessy vision in later opinions by Rehnquist himself when
he cites, with approval, the Civil Rights Cases of 1883 in his Violence Against Women Act
opinion in United States v. Morrison”).  In many ways, the New Federalism, and originalism
more broadly, can be understood as a Second Redemption reaction to the Second Recon-
struction of the Warren Court. See Roosevelt, supra note 252, at 141–42.
254 See generally Barry Friedman, The Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1
(1998) (arguing historical analysis is essential to understanding the Constitution).
255 See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 12–13 (1883).
256 See Statement of Rep. Garfield, supra note 128, at 153.
257 See supra note 225 and accompanying text.  A point against this reading of Bradley’s R
opinion is that Justice Harlan’s dissent, which seems to be making an honest effort to
muster the strongest arguments in favor of the Civil Rights Act, does not mention state
neglect either.
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The same evidence was available in 1875, Morrison said, and the gov-
ernment lost then, so it must lose again in 2000.258  The implicit offer
was never available; the requirement was abruptly changed to some-
thing else.
That is what, in the consumer marketplace, would be called a bait
and switch.  As constitutional law, it is objectionable for two reasons.
First, it is unfair to Congress.  Legislators, building on the work of
scholars, devised an approach to the problem of gender bias in state
justice systems that they had every reason to think would be accept-
able under the Court’s precedents.  The Court then struck it down on
the basis of a limitation that had never before existed, with no expla-
nation beyond a transparently false appeal to precedent.
Second, the Bradley-Rehnquist shuffle shortchanges an impor-
tant period of our constitutional history.  Redemption did follow
Reconstruction, and there are Supreme Court decisions from that era
that embody a particular view of race relations and the federal-state
balance of power. To the extent they have not been overruled, they
are still good law.  But there was a Second Reconstruction that came
after Redemption, which overruled some of those decisions and lim-
ited others.259  (The separate-but-equal principle, for instance, was re-
jected.260)  What about private party immunity from Section 5
enforcement legislation?  That was not a principle that the
Redemption-era cases ever announced.  But if they had announced it,
it is a pretty safe bet that the Warren Court would have rejected it.
Guest, which accepts the prosecution of a group of only private indi-
viduals, implicitly does just that; indeed, it shows that six votes existed
for the far stronger holding that such prosecutions could go forward
in the absence of state action entirely.261  So the bait and switch is
unfair to other actors as well.  It is unfair to the Warren Court and the
social and political movements that accompanied it to pretend that
this principle existed in the first Redemption and survived the Second
Reconstruction, when it did neither of those things.262
What does all this mean?  We do not need to recover the concept
of state neglect.263  It never left.  What we need to do is realize that
258 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 624–27 (2000).
259 C. Vann Woodward, The Political Legacy of Reconstruction, 26 J. NEGRO EDUC. 231, 240
(1957) (describing the Second Reconstruction).
260 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495–96 (1953).
261 See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
262 How to reconcile different eras of constitutional understanding is a complicated
topic, which Bruce Ackerman has explored under the name of intergenerational synthesis.
See Bruce Ackerman, 1 WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 140–62 (1991) (describing concept).
My point here is only that attributing to the past principles that were not announced then
and would not have survived had they been is not a good way to go about it.
263 Brandwein’s argument in favor of the need of recovery persistently understates the
extent to which the concept of state neglect exists in current law.  For instance, she argues
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Morrison’s rule of private party immunity is made up from whole cloth.
It is not supported by the Civil Rights Cases.  But that does not mean it
is wrong, only that we should consider it on its own merits.  The next
Part does that.
V
SECTION 5 LEGISLATION AND PRIVATE
PARTIES RECONSIDERED
Earlier, I noted that successful doctrine must meet several re-
quirements.264  Private party immunity from Section 5 legislation
meets some of them.  It is a clear rule, easy for courts to enforce and
nonjudicial actors to understand.  It also imposes a real and meaning-
ful limit on Congress.  But there remains the most fundamental ques-
tion: is it doing something sensible in terms of implementing the
relevant constitutional provision?265
that “recovery of the state neglect concept . . . open[s] up for the first time” the possibility
of a constitutional claim for victims of domestic violence “if it could be established that the
police provided less protection to victims of domestic violence compared to other kinds of
violence.” BRANDWEIN, supra note 172, at 243.  That claim exists and has been recognized
by courts and commentators. See, e.g., Watson v. City of Kansas City, 857 F.2d 690, 694
(10th Cir. 1988) (“Although there is no general constitutional right to police protection,
the state may not discriminate in providing such protection.”).  The hurdle for such a
claim is that discrimination between domestic and stranger violence is not considered sex
discrimination and will get rational basis review. See Watson, 857 F.2d at 696–97 (treating
domestic-violence discrimination separately from sex discrimination).  This is a problem of
disparate impact doctrine, not a failure to recognize state neglect as a constitutional viola-
tion. See generally Amy Eppler, Note, Battered Women and the Equal Protection Clause: Will the
Constitution Help Them When the Police Won’t?, 95 YALE L. J. 788 (1986) (arguing for equal
protection claim because a no-arrest policy in domestic violence disputes results in sex
discrimination).  Indeed, as far as sex discrimination in enforcement goes, Morrison itself
accepts the theory that selective failure to protect violates equal protection. See 529 U.S. at
619–20.
Other scholars have also linked the state neglect concept to Bradley’s opinion in the
Civil Rights Cases. See, e.g., Robin L. West, Equality Theory, Marital Rape, and the Promise of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 42 FLA. L. REV. 45, 62 (1990) (arguing for “pure protection” under-
standing of equal protection on the grounds that “as Justice Bradley suggested in the Civil
Rights Cases, a southern state’s refusal to grant a common law cause of action to black
travelers to protect them against southern white innkeepers’ refusals of service would con-
stitute a violation of the equal protection clause” (citations omitted)).  Perhaps most strik-
ingly, the Supreme Court explicitly endorsed the state neglect concept in 1989, in DeShaney
v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197 n.3 (1989) (“The State may not, of
course, selectively deny its protective services to certain disfavored minorities without vio-
lating the Equal Protection Clause.”).  Brandwein discusses DeShaney but does not mention
this footnote. See BRANDWEIN, supra note 172, at 242–43.
264 See supra notes 77–80 and accompanying text.
265 This is not asking whether the doctrine gets cases right in terms of the meaning of
the Constitution.  That might be a desirable feature, but sometimes prophylactic doctrine
is a good choice too. See generally ROOSEVELT, supra note 17, at 22–47 (discussing doctrine
creation); Strauss, supra note 78 (arguing that prophylactic rules are central and necessary
to constitutional law).
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The point of Section 5 is relatively clear: it is to allow Congress to
legislate in order to make the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment more effective than they would otherwise be.266  Good imple-
menting doctrine will allow Congress to do this: it will not create a
situation where some violations of the Amendment cannot be ad-
dressed, especially if those violations are important ones.
At the same time, implementing doctrine should set limits on the
enforcement power.  There are three main reasons why such limits
are desirable.  First, excessively broad enforcement power threatens
individual liberty.267  Second, it threatens the balance of power be-
tween the states and the federal government.268  And last, it threatens
separation of powers within the federal government: excessive en-
forcement authority could allow Congress to effectively determine the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.269
The question, then, is whether banning Section 5 regulation of
private parties does a good job in terms of preserving congressional
authority to address important violations while at the same time re-
straining that authority so as to protect the values of liberty, federal-
ism, and separation of powers.  Analysis will show that it really does
none of these things well.
The concern about individual liberty is easy to formulate. Individ-
uals, by themselves, cannot violate the Constitution.  Why should Con-
gress have the power to regulate them?  Why should these individuals
be subject to federal authority through no fault of their own but
rather because of what someone else—some state actor—has done?
The image of individuals minding their own business, doing
nothing that triggers congressional power, only to be swept willy-nilly
into the maw of federal regulation, is a potent one, at least for today’s
Court.  Justice Roberts invoked it in the healthcare case to argue that
the individual mandate could not be sustained under the Commerce
266 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce, by ap-
propriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”).
267 See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936(1982) (“Careful adherence to
the ‘state action’ requirement preserves an area of individual freedom by limiting the
reach of federal law and federal judicial power.”).
268 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 620 (2000) (claiming that limitations
on the Section 5 power “are necessary to prevent the Fourteenth Amendment from obliter-
ating the Framers’ carefully crafted balance of power between the States and the National
Government”).  As noted earlier, the Reconstruction Amendments were intended precisely
to alter the Framers’ carefully crafted balance, so Morrison looks to the wrong standard.
Still, the desire to find some limit is sensible.
269 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519–20 (1997) (stating that “Congress
does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right is”).  Again, this is not to
endorse the Boerne approach to Section 5, which makes a fundamental error by asking
whether enforcement legislation goes too far beyond the Court’s doctrine, rather than the
Constitution’s meaning. See Roosevelt, supra note 82, at 1680–83.
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Clause.270  But this image fits Section 5 regulation much less well.  In
the state neglect scenario, the regulated individual is not someone
minding his own business. He is violating state law. He is engaging in
conduct that the state-level majority recognizes as wrongful and pun-
ishes when it is committed against them.  There is no reasonable claim
that his conduct should not be regulated.
But perhaps it should be regulated by the states rather than the
federal government?  Of course it should be regulated by the states—
that is what the Constitution demands.271  But that state regulation is
not forthcoming. The question is what should or may happen when
the best solution is unobtainable.  And the answer that federal regula-
tion may fill the void does not strike me as especially problematic.272
The demand for regulation is federal in nature, after all—it comes
from the federal Constitution.  That this federal demand should be
satisfied through federal legislation is not incongruous.273
Nor is there much of a case to be made that allowing Section 5
regulation of private parties threatens the balance of state and federal
powers.  Section 5 in general, and its use in cases of state neglect in
particular, are probably less threatening to federalism values than
other congressional powers.  There is a built-in check on their exer-
cise: Congress must show that states are not fulfilling their constitu-
tional obligations before it can act.  There is thus no danger—as there
is with the Commerce Clause—that Congress will usurp state authority
over fields that could as well or better be left to the states.274  Those
270 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2592 (2012) (rejecting
the idea that Congress could “reach beyond the natural limit of its authority and draw
within its regulatory scope those who otherwise would be outside of it” as compared to
“those who by some preexisting activity bring themselves within the sphere of federal
regulation”).
271 See U.S. CONST. amend. X; 132 S. Ct. at 2578 (“The States thus can and do perform
many of the vital functions of modern government—punishing street crime . . . .”).
272 In McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819), John Marshall indi-
cated that a decision about the limits of federal power (what he called an adjustment of
“the respective powers of those who are equally the representatives of the people”) called
for less aggressive judicial review than one that implicated individual rights, “the great
principles of liberty.” Id. at 401.  With its deference to federal authority but more search-
ing review of state legislation that burdens political outsiders, McCulloch quite strikingly
anticipates the general stance of the Warren Court. See id. at 431 (rejecting the argument
that Maryland could be trusted not to abuse the power to tax the Bank of the United
States).
273 Indeed, the accountability principle that has become part of our federalism might
suggest a preference for federal legislation.  State laws enacted at federal command are
undesirable because they blur lines of accountability, but the same is true of state laws
enacted or enforced at the command of the Constitution.  Substituting federal legislation
at least demonstrates that the duty being enforced is federal in nature. See New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168–69 (1992) (discussing accountability problems with fed-
eral commandeering of state legislatures).
274 See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 29 (2005) (“It is beyond peradventure that federal
power over commerce is ‘superior to that of the States to provide for the welfare or necessi-
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are areas of state autonomy whose preservation has real value.  When,
on the other hand, states are not capable of adequate regulation, or
when they refuse to do so in violation of their constitutional obliga-
tions, federalization is an appropriate response.
Finally, a categorical ban on regulation of private parties does
very little to preserve the Court’s interpretive authority.  I do think it
makes sense to give the Court the last word on the meaning of the
Constitution, though I do not think that this principle leads to the
Boerne doctrine.275  But allowing Congress to regulate private parties,
when that is an appropriate means to deter or remedy constitutional
violations by states, does not amount to giving it authority to change
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
What benefits does the limit bring?  Very few. It seems to be es-
sentially a line that is convenient to draw, even if it is unrelated to the
purpose of the underlying provision.  That is not very good constitu-
tional doctrine, though it is of a piece with much of the New Federal-
ism.  With respect to the Commerce Clause, for instance, Morrison and
Lopez tell us that intrastate noncommercial activity cannot be regu-
lated, even though it might harm interstate commerce or have spil-
lover effects that create collective action problems.276 Sebelius likewise
tells us that “inactivity” cannot be regulated, even if it substantially
affects interstate commerce (and even if the “inactive” people, in the
aggregate, engage in $43 billion worth of economic activity that, as a
result of their “inactivity,” others must pay for).277  These are exam-
ples of what I would call doctrine that is not asking the right ques-
tions: if the purpose of the commerce power is to allow Congress to
protect commerce, or to regulate when the states are separately in-
competent, doctrine that blocks congressional action in such cases
because of formalistic distinctions between commercial and
ties of their inhabitants,’ however legitimate or dire those necessities may be.”) (citations
omitted).
275 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 529 (1997) (rejecting idea that “Congress
could define its own powers by altering the Fourteenth Amendment’s meaning”).
276 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 656–57 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting);
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559–60 (1995).
277 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2611 (2012) (Ginsburg,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating dollar value of healthcare provided
without compensation to uninsured patients who failed to pay).  From one perspective,
Sebelius and Morrison are very similar in the structure of their arguments.  In both cases, a
proper subject of regulation exists: discriminatory state actors who are violating individual
rights, and insurance companies (commercial actors) who are now being told to issue cov-
erage without regard to preexisting conditions.  The question in each case is whether Con-
gress can regulate someone else, someone not subject to regulation because of anything
they have done themselves, in order to make the regulation of the proper subject effective.
The answer the Court gives in both cases is no, because such regulation is not proper.  But
why not? Sebelius has an answer—these are people who did nothing to subject themselves
to federal authority.  But whether that answer is persuasive or not, it is not available in
Morrison, and the Court did not try to provide an alternative.
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noncommercial activity, or activity and inactivity, is probably drawing
the wrong lines.278
Such limits are tolerable if, like the Commerce Clause carve-outs,
they have little practical effect.  Congress can still probably reach most
intrastate noncommercial activity by using a comprehensive regula-
tory scheme or including a jurisdictional hook.  It is unlikely to find
much need to require “inactive” individuals to purchase commercial
products.279  Moreover, if it did, it could accomplish the same result
through the taxing power.280
Forbidding Section 5 regulation of private parties, however, has
real effects.  Without the ability to regulate individuals, Congress has
no realistic means of remedying state neglect.  If, as I and others have
suggested, state neglect was actually at the heart of the original under-
standing of the Equal Protection Clause, this is a significant cost.281
CONCLUSION
The Court’s decision in the Civil Rights Cases is frequently criti-
cized, but closer inspection reveals that it is not as bad as the reflexive
revulsion of many assessments suggests.  The state action doctrine it
278 Sometimes, of course, administrability will be a very important concern and will
justify a substantial gap between doctrine and meaning.  With Miranda, for instance, the
Court found itself poorly positioned to decide whether a confession was voluntary (the
relevant question as far as meaning is concerned), and so it substituted a bright-line pro-
phylactic requirement (the Miranda warning) for the totality of the circumstances test it
had been using. See Roosevelt, supra note 82, at 1671–72.  Importantly, however, once R
police adjusted their behavior in light of this prophylactic rule and administered the warn-
ings, cases tended to come out consistent with constitutional meaning—postwarning con-
fessions tended to be voluntary. See generally Strauss, supra note 78 (arguing that R
prophylactic rules help achieve constitutional results).  Similar adjustment with the Com-
merce Clause carve-outs is harder, though perhaps the jurisdictional hook is an equivalent.
279 When the federal government wanted to bail out the automakers, for instance, it
did not require every American to purchase a car.  It simply gave the corporations taxpayer
money. See, e.g., Maurice E. Stucke, Reconsidering Competition, 81 MISS. L.J. 107, 108 (2011)
(describing bailouts).
280 The existence of taxing power authority was the basis on which Chief Justice
Roberts upheld the individual mandate in Sebelius, see 132 S. Ct. at 2600, but there is a
different way in which the taxing power permits compelled purchases: the government can
simply direct tax revenues to businesses and require them to provide products in ex-
change.  It could have, for instance, effectively required everyone to buy a GM car by pro-
viding the bailout it did and requiring GM in return to “give” everyone a “free” car.
281 How significant depends on whether private parties are actually supposed to be
immune from Section 5 regulation, or whether something like a jurisdictional hook demon-
strating state neglect in individual cases would allow remedies against individuals.  Immu-
nity seems flatly inconsistent with Guest, so the possibility of a jurisdictional hook remains
open. See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 759 n.17 (1966).  Something like the VAWA
civil rights remedy could be offered to any victim of gender-motivated violence who had
sought state redress and been denied because of unconstitutional bias.  Proving bias in
particular cases is hard, though, and such a hook would effectively operate as an exhaus-
tion requirement with respect to state-law remedies.  This version of the remedy would
place so heavy a burden on plaintiffs that it would probably be almost entirely ineffectual.
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sets out is now generally accepted as a limit on the scope of the Consti-
tution in general and the Fourteenth Amendment in particular.
There is, however, no reason to suppose that the limits of the
enforcement power precisely track those of the Amendment.  The
Civil Rights Cases say nothing about this second issue.  The fact that
individuals cannot violate the Amendment does not necessarily mean
that they cannot be regulated via the enforcement power in appropri-
ate cases.  That principle comes from Morrison, and from Morrison
alone.
Purporting to rely on precedent, Morrison offers no argument in
favor of this rule.  Further investigation suggests that it is undesirable
as a matter of first impression.  Section 5 legislation will naturally take
two different forms.  If the state violates the Fourteenth Amendment
by its explicit acts—if it openly denies that certain individuals are enti-
tled to equal rights—then enforcement legislation should forbid
those state acts and allow remedies against the state.  But if the viola-
tion takes the form of a sub rosa selective refusal to honor or enforce
rights purportedly granted under state law, direct remedies against
the state are impractical.  Providing federal rights as an alternative to
the state rights that have proved ineffective is a perfectly reasonable
enforcement measure.  The alternative is to let these sorts of equal
protection violations go unremedied.  Since they go to the heart of
the original understanding of equal protection, that is a bad choice.
Nothing but Morrison stands in the way of accepting such enforcement
legislation, and Morrison stands on nothing at all.  It should be re-
jected at the first opportunity.
